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PREFACE
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thes is:
Doctor A# Stanley Trickett, who served as ray patient 
Advisor throughout the period of preparing this paper.
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Command and General Staff College,
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The Japanese practice of giving family names first 
has been followed in referring to Japanese persons. The 
Roraanization of Japanese names after the Senyusha system 
has been followed.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
The period from 1902 through 1922 is an important 
phase in the International relations of Japan. At the out­
set of this period, Nippon signed a defensive Alliance with 
Great Britain which served as a warning to the other Europe­
an Powers who had interests or designs in the Orient. A few 
years later, Japan astounded the world by defeating Russia 
in a war waged because of conflicting ambitions in Manchuria 
and Korea. While Nippon did not obtain a monetary indemnity 
from St. Petersburg, she did gain recognition of her para­
mount Interests in Korea, territorial and economic conces­
sions on the Liaotung peninsula and Manchuria and outright 
cession of the southern half of Sakhalin, Of greater impor­
tance was the enhancement of her prestige throughout the 
Orient. At the same time, the European Powers awakened to 
the fact that they could no longer encroach with Impunity 
upon the mainland of Asia,'**
The Russo-Japanese War was followed by a period in 
which Tokyo consolidated her gains on the mainland of Asia
^A.J.P. Taylor, The Struggle for Mastery In Europe 
1343-1913 (Oxford: The~ Clarendon !Press, l9?4), p. 400} G. 
Nye Steiger, A History of the Par East (Boston: Ginn and
Company, 19wt> PP. 716^2$.
toy obtaining agreements with France and Russia, The exchange 
of the Root-Takahira notes of 1906 were interpreted toy the 
Tokyo Government as recognition of her existing gains in China 
rather than emphasis on the fTopen door,1' Korea's annexation 
was accomplished in 1910 without any official protest by the 
West and Tokyo now had a de jure right for a permanent foot­
hold in Asia. The signing of the renewal of the Anglo-Japan­
ese Alliance in 1911 gave the .Nipponese firm grounds for 
entering the World War, While her military role was small in 
comparison to that of the Western Powers, Tokyo emerged from
the war holding possession of the Klaochow leasehold in Shan-
2
tung and the German colonies north of the equator.
Negotiations at the Peace Conference at Paris were 
conducted toy the Tokyo delegation in a largely defensive way. 
It was readily evident that they were outmatched in diploma­
tic maneuvering by the Chinese with their superior training 
in Western techniques of communication and propaganda. Nip­
pon's ultimate victory was 11 negative” in the sense that it was 
obtained only as a means to save the Conference*-^ Seeds of
2Stanley K. Hornbeck, Contemporary Politics in the Far 
East {New York: D, Appleton and Company, 1926T, pp.
Eomas E. Ennis, Eastern Asia (Chicago: J, B. LIppincott Com­
pany, 1946), P. 292Z
3
Roy W* Curry, Woodrow WiIson and Far Eastern Policy 
(New York; Bookman Associates, l^ST), p.~lT79.
3doubt were planted and. Treat Britain realized that she m a t
seriousiy weigh the effect* of a .renewal of the Anglo*Japan*
«st Alliance; both as ±t would effect her relations with the
*»
Dominions and the on-,ted i t e a  •'■*
Soma tins after the Peace aettle.ment, the Nipponese 
somewhat reluctantly agreed to attend a conferance in Wash­
ington in 1021 to disc lies the limitation* of armaments and the 
problems of the Far East mud the Pacific. rim *«*nineton Con­
ference culminated ir. the drawing up of a Pour-Power Pact, a 
Five-Power K&val Treaty* & Power Treaty concerning China
i-ne. tbs * s I* tie went of the out,« tan ding problems concerning 
Shantung, Yep, end the Jape.uese troops re'main m g  in CIberia.
Hr d#r the preset?re of wcr.ld opinion, the ‘vokjo Oovcm^ent was 
ferot-d ti: give In cn .many issues growing out- of g»ins made at 
iht* ? Feace Conference end f'aper, accepted a changed role in 
the -ar £&<? t*
It ir the purpose of this thesis to set forth the his­
torical dais which directly contributed to Japan1s rise in 
Inleruatform 1 power and prertige miring the twenty year peri­
od of 19C2-19??. Fo r*t tcamt hae been made to either justify
^A , Whitney lri;:vold, lar Faoterm £olic*^ of, the, United 
States (New York; Harcourt. Brace "anST Co7. 1936), pp. 273-
?s?r:
^Steiger, op. c it« > pi>• 789-Bok.
4or condemn th© Tokyo Government*s role during these years, 
but merely to present th© significant historical events as 
they occurred* An attempt has been made to incorporate as 
many Japanese works as possible in order to set forth a 
balanced history of this period.
In order to better correlate th® events between these 
twenty years, it will b© necessary to summarize some of the 
more important developments in Japanese internal and foreign 
relations from the time of Perry*s visit to Japan in 1853 J a 
visit which prompted th© end of the era of isolation.
Japan’s foreign relations prior to the sixteenth cen­
tury were mainly limited to contacts with Korea and China. 
Indeed, Japan gained most of her culture from China as evi­
denced by her adoption of the Chinese method of writing, 
painting, sculpture, and family system. This culture was 
transmitted to Japan by her contacts with China, and with 
Korea which was under the suzerainty of China*^
The English, Dutch, Portuguese, and Spanish were the 
first western nations to enter Japan. While all of these 
nations were primarily interested In commerce, the Portuguese 
and Spanish actively attempted to convert the Japanese nation 
to Christianity. Early success attended the efforts to prop­
agate the Gospel; between 15^9 and the arrival of Francis 
Xavier and the end of the century, some 300,000 Japanese be­
came Christians.
In 1636, the shogun lyemitsu expelled all foreigners
1
Robert P. Porter, Japan The Rise of 1a Modern Power 
(Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1919)» p* A. L. Kroeger,
Anthropology (Hew York: Hareourt, Brace and Company), pp.
743-71*4.
2
Porter, £p, cIt., p. 36; Lawrence II. Battistini, 
Japan and America (Hew York: The John Day Co., 19f?i^ ), p. 4*
6from Japan* Thirteen survivors front a Portuguese ship, which
defied th© edict and entered Nagasaki Bay four years later,
were permitted to return to Macao with the massages *So long
as the sun warms the earth, any Christian bold enough to come
to Japan, even if he be King Philip himself or the Sod of the
Christians shall pay for it with M s  head** As a warning,
3the rest of th© crew were executed* While trade with the 
Portuguese and .Dutch was permitted, the former were confined 
to an artificial islet at Deshima, near Nagasaki| the Nether-
hlanders faced slra!liar restrictions at Rirado*
In 1853, President Fillmore decided to dispatch a 
strong naval fore© to Japan for the dual purpose of retaliat­
ing tor affronts and establishing commercial relations with 
Japan* On July 3th of that year, Commodore Matthew 0* Perry 
arrived in Japan with a squadron of four paddle-wheel type 
ships. After stopping off at Uraga, Perry sailed into Tokyo 
Bay where he presented the President*© letter to the Japanese
officials and announced to them that he would return a year
later for an answer* While the Americans were mainly inter­
ested in making arrangements for th® welfare of shipwrecked 
American sailors and providing for the refueling and provi­
sioning of American ships, Perry was also interested In ob~
3Porter, ©£. olt., p. ??»
Ipaysoa «T. Treat, The Far East (Haw Yorks Harper and 
Brothers, 1923), p. 180,
7taining a foothold in Japan, Korea, the Liu Gh1ius and Formo­
sa in order to counteract the expansion of Russia and Eng-
r'
land in the Far East*
At th© time of Perryf3 visit to Japan, the shogun. 
or military ruler, actually held th© political and economic 
reins of the government, while the Emperor mainly concerned 
himself with court matters and the bestowal of titles* Under 
the ahogunate were certain feudal lords or dalmyo who owed 
their allegiance to the shogun* The shoyunate sought the 
advice of the dalmylo after receiving President Fillmore1® 
letter and while their opinions were divided, most of them 
favored the continuance of the exclusion policy.^
The Russians learned of Perryrs expedition and dis­
patched Admiral Putiatln. and. four naval vessels to Nagasaki 
with a demand for a boundary settlement as well as th© estab­
lishment of trade relations with the Japanese* However, the 
Admiral13 fleet suddenly left in October of 1853 when he 
learned that his country was preparing for a war, later to be
^0 hit os hi Yan&ga, Japan Since Perry (Hew York: McGraw
Hull Book Co*, 191l9), p* c.*i; John F* Smbree, The Japanese 
Hation (Hew York: Farrar and Rinehart, Inc *,1Tfifv'), pp* 12-23•
6Claude A • .Buss, The Far hast (Hew York: Macmillan
Company, 1955), pp* lJO-TJT.
87known as the Crimean Mar.
Perry returned to Japan on January 16, 1854 upon learn­
ing of Admiral Putiatin* s visit and put in at K&nag&wa to re­
ceive the reply to the President1s letter. The Japanese de­
cided to receive the Americans and after the exchange of gifts 
and several weeks of negotiations, the Treaty of Kanagawa was 
signed on March 31, 1854* The treaty contained the following
Pt
ten articles which are briefly summarised:
Article I - Peace and amity established between the 
United States and Japan.
Article IX - The ports of Shimoda and Hakodate 
opened to United States ships.
Article III - In the event of a shipwreck, crews to 
be delivered to one of the above two ports.
Article IV - Shipwrecked Americans and fcther United 
States citizens are not subject to confinement.
Article V - Shipwrecked Americans are free to travel 
within seven miles from Shimoda.
Article VI - . . .  .
Article VII - United States ships are permitted to 
exchange gold and silver coins for other articles.
Article VIII - Mood, water and provisions are to be 
obtained only through authorized Japanese sources.
Article IX - The United States and her citizens are 
to be granted any additional rights subsequently granted 
to any other nations*
Article X - United States ships are not to enter any 
other ports except in an emergency,”
The treaty was not entirely satisfactory to th© United 
States since neither one of the two treaty ports was suitable 
for commercial trade and because such trade as was permitted
A
~jBinnls, op. clt. s pp. 167-168.
Mould be essentially on a barter basis. nevertheless, the
treaty represented a diplomatic advantage over both the
Netherlands and Russia, who failed to obtain a treaty, and It
marked the reopening of Japan to membership in the family of
civilised nations*
Simlliar trestles were negotiated between Japan and
Great Britain, (October, l851i); H u b s  la, (February, 1855)5 and
Holland (January, 1856). Bv 1856, each of these powers was
given the status of a most favored nation and entitled to:
obtain supplies at Shlmoda, Hakodate, and Nagasaki; trade
through Japanese officials at these ports; appoint consuls at
Shimoda and Hakodate; male residence at Nagasaki; limited extra
9territorial jurisdiction.
On August 21, 1856, the first American Consul-General, 
Townsend Harris, arrived in Japan. Although the Japanese were 
at first suspicious of his motives, ho gradually convinced 
them of his sincerity and as a result of his patient efforts, 
he obtained an additional treaty which was signed on June 20, 
1858. This treaty of amity and commerce provided:
(1) The exchange of ministers and consuls*
(2) In addition to Shimoda and Hakodate, the ports 
of ilsnagawa (now Yokohama), Nagasaki, Niigata, and Hyogo 
were to be open to American ships.
(3) Customs were to be imposed on Imports and exports.
h a u l  H. Clyde, the Far East (Englewood Cliffs, S. J.: 
Prentice-Ha11, Inc., Third Edition, 1958), p. 191.
10
(11) Extraterritoriality to b@ recognized for United 
States nationals*
(5) Freedom of worship was to b© allowed.
(6) The President of the United States, upon request 
of the Japanese, was to act as a mediator between Japan 
and European Powers*
(7) The Japanese were entitled to purchase ships and 
munitions and engage American naval and other military 
personnel, scientists, artisans, mariners, etc., in order 
to develop the country*
The treaty was followed by a similiar treaty between Japan and
30Holland, Great Britain and Franc©•
Trie years from 1859 until the end of th© shogunate in 
186? were marked by internal di&sention between th.© daimyo 
and the ruling Tokugawa clan. There were also frequent anti- 
foreign outbreaks and in September of 1363, a British subject, 
G. 1. Hichardson, was killed near Yokohama. As a result of 
this incident, the British Government demanded a heavy indem­
nity, and the trial and execution of th© assassins* Follow­
ing this incident, th© Emperor, on June 25, 1363, ordered th© 
expulsion of all foreigners* On that day, ships and forts be­
longing to th© Lord of Chosu opened fire on American trading 
ships at anchor near Shimonoseki. Then followed a series of 
similiar attacks on French and Dutch ships which evoked Brit­
ish retaliation when they bombed Kagoshima in order to enforce 
their demands for th© capture of Hi chard s on1s assassins. Lat­
er in August the British joined th© American, Dutch and French
10Xanaga, op* cit., pp. 26-27; William Elliot Griffis, 
Townsend Harris - First American Envoy in Japan (Boston: 
Sough'ton,T Ki'fjflin ancT Company, 1395), PP* 266-277*
11
ships In an attack against Chosu and by September 8th, all
shore batteries had been silenced through their combined
11 —  
efforts. The following month, the shogun signed a conven­
tion in which Japan agreed to pay a ^3,000,000 indemnity to 
the foreigners. In addition, the straits of Shimonoseki were
not to be fortified and it was agreed that they woulu be open
12
to the commerce of all nations.
The Emperor Komai died on February 3$ 1867 and was suc­
ceeded by his fourteen year old son, Mutsuhito, who ruled un­
der the name of He u i >  or ”Enlightened Government.” Soon after 
the new reign began, the power of the shogun, who had ruled
Japan for more than 250 years, was broken and destroyed by th©
13restoration of the imperial power.
Following the restoration of the Emperor, the Japanese 
attempted to normalize relations with the Korean Government 
and in 1370, and again in 1872, envoys were sent to Seoul to 
explain the recent changes in the government. The Koreans re­
pelled any attempt to reestablish friendly relations since 
they classified the Japanese In th© same category as the 
’’western barbarians.” J a pane s e -K or e a n relations continued to 
deteriorate until 1875$ at which time the two nations became
11Payson J. Treat, Japan and the United States 1853- 
1921 (Boston: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1921), pp. 5*4--&6.
12Yanaga, op. cit., p. 32.
■^Porter, op. cit., p. 109.
12
involved in a brief conflict. Th© Koreans fired upon a Jap­
anese warship, ostensibly on a coastal survey mission, which 
had put into the Korean port of Kanghwa for fuel. Th© Jap­
anese easily overcame the coastal defenses and took advantage 
of the situation to force a treaty of commerce upon th© Ko­
rean Government. The Treaty of Kanghwa, signed in February 
of 1876, provided for the opening of the three ports of Fu- 
san, Jinsen and Sensen, the exchange of Ministers and Consuls 
and th© establishment of consular Jurisdiction. However, It 
was not until i860 that the final details governing the open­
ing of the ports and th© exchange of Ministers was outlined 
and made effective.^
The signing of the Treaty of Kanghwa touched' off a 
struggle between th© progressive and conservative factions at 
th© Korean court. Th© progressive faction favored closer re­
lations with Japan while th© conservative faction acknowledged 
the traditional suzerainty of China over Korea. In a riot in 
Seoul in 1882, the Japanese legation was attacked and several 
Japanese were killed; during the fighting, th© Japanese Minis­
ter, Mr. Hanabusa, was forced to take refuge aboard a British 
ship. The Japanese immediately dispatched two warships and 
an infantry battalion and demanded: (1) an official apology
^Tanaga, op. cit., pp, 1C 6-13-7; Treat, Japan and the 
United States, pp. 287-288• -**—  —  -
13
for the Incident; (2) punishment of th© perpetuators; (3) an 
Indemnity to the families of those killed and an indemnity 
for the damage to Japanese property. The affair was settled 
by the Treaty of Chemulpo of August 30, 1882. in addition to 
meeting all the demands of the Japanese, th© treaty also pro­
vided for the stationing of troops in Korea to protect the
Japanese Legation. A similiar provision pertaining to the
15stationing of Chinese troops wa® agreed upon.
The treaty did little to solve th© internal unrest 
among the two factions. On December k» I88I4., followers of 
the pro-Japanese faction set fire to the Seoul Post Office, 
which was ©bout to be dedicated, and assassinated several 
members of the Korean cabinet in attendance at th® ceremonies. 
The progressive faction then formed it® own cabinet and 
appealed to th© Japanese Minister, in th© name of the Korean 
King* for protection. At th® asm® time, th© conservative 
faction made a similiar appeal to th© Chines© Government. 
Troops from both nations clashed on the palace grounds and 
bitter feelings developed between the Japanese and Chines© 
in Korea. The Japanese Government dispatched the Minister 
of the Imperial Household, Ito Hirobuai, to negotiate with 
the Tientsin Viceroy* LI Hung-chang. The resulting Tientsin
15
Yanaga, op. cit.. p. 196; Steiger, op. c„it .* p. 662.
114-
Convention, ©Iso known as the Li-Ito* Convention, provided that 
th© troops of both nations would be withdrawn from Korea with­
in four months and specified that neither nation was to take 
part in the training of Korean troops, in the eventuality 
that troops were again needed to put down any grave disturbance, 
China and Japan ©greed to consult in writing in advance and,
following the settlement of the matter, to withdraw the troops
l 6 « *
without further delay. Hi© Li-Ito* Convention was only a 
temporary solution to the problem of internal Intervention in 
Korea and a few years later, trouble would again break out over 
conflicting interests.
Th© Japanese Government had long desired to replace th© 
unequal treaties with the foreign governments and, in 1870, 
each nation with whom she had a treaty was notified of her 
desire for a treaty revision. Bo Immediate steps were taken, 
however, since it was considered more desirable to Institute 
domestic reforms and undertake a thorough study of European 
and American governmental, financial, industrial and educa­
tional institutions. In 107U* © decision was reached to 
create a special bureau for consideration of the treaties 
which might be revised. Two years later, Vic© Minister T©ra­
sh im a and Minister Yoshida opened negotiations to this end.
^Ennls, op. cit., pp. 277-278; Yansga, op. cit., p. 188.
15
A treaty was finally signed in Washington on July 25, 1878 
which restored tariff autonomy to Japan with the provision 
that th© other treaty nations must also agree to th© change# 
Sine© Great Britain and the other interested nations objec­
ted, th© treaty did not take effect# Following extended nego­
tiations, th© British Minister, Mr. F. R* Plunkett, announced 
on April 10, I88I4., that unequal treaties would b© abolished 
at such time as the Japanese adopted a legal cod® similiar to 
that of the western nations. The Japanese immediately under­
took to compile such a code and hired several foreign legal
17experts to assist them.
On May 1, 1386, Foreign Minister Inou© again reopened 
negotiations with the representatives of the foreign powers 
for a treaty revision. An Anglo-German draft was submitted, 
setting forth a joint proposal concerning the civil and crim­
inal code; th© establishment of courts of consular jurisdic­
tion, th© appointment of foreign judges and procurators for
th© trial of foreigners, and th© revision of tariff and import 
18duties* Th© provision for th© appointment of foreign judi­
cial officials became known throughout the nation and a storm 
of protests arose* Foreign Minister Inoue resigned from
l?Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 192-193. 
l8Ibid.
16
office and was replaced by Okuma Shigenobu* Okuma wisely de­
cided to negotiate separately with each power and following 
th© signing of an equal treaty with Mexico on November 30, 
1888, similiar treaties were obtained with Great Britain, 
(1894)I United States, (1894); Italy, (1894)> Germany, (1895)$ 
Bussia, (1895)$ and France, (1896)* In general, these trea­
ties provided for: equal treatment in travel and trade;
acceptance of a most favored nation clause; abolition of 
alien land ownership rights after th® expiration of the lease; 
a new tariff ad valorem rat®*^ By these treaty revisions, 
Japan obtained political and economic ©quality with th© West, 
In 1094# & Korean dissident sect called th© Tong 
Hades, precipitated a war which served to demonstrate Japan’s 
military strength to the West and at th© sara© time, the in­
ternal weakness of China* The Tong Haks were founded in 1850 
with th© object of combining th© better elements of Taoism, 
Buddhism and Confucianism* However, they had developed into 
a chauvinistic, anti-Japanese military group* As a result of 
repeated riots for which they were responsible, the Korean 
King called upon the Chinese for troops to quell the disorder* 
The Chinese dispatched 1,500 troops and then notified th© 
Japanese, under the terras of the LI -I to Convention, that th©
19yanaga, op* cit*, pp. 194-197.
17
troops would be withdrawn following the settlement of the 
disturbances. The Japanese thereupon sent $,000 troops to 
protect the Ip,000 Japanese residents in Korea and establish­
ed a headquarters at Chemulpo. The Korean King asked the 
Chinese troops to leave but they declined to withdraw until 
after the Japanese left. The Japanese, in turn, declined to
leave until the Chinese gave guarantees that they would carry
20
out the terms of the Li-Ito Convention.
On July 25, IS9k» the Chinese fired upon three Japan­
ese warships enroute to Korea; the Japanese retaliated, sink­
ing one Chinese troop transport and capturing another. A few 
days later on August 1st, Nippon declared war upon China and 
immediately began a vigorous military campaign. A month lat­
er, the Japanese Fleet under Admiral Ito, captured the Chinese 
Fleet in a battle fought in the Yellow Sea anu the Nipponese 
demonstrated their naval superiority for the duration of the 
war. In rapid succession, Nipponese ground forces captured the 
Chinese strongholds In Korea and Invaded Manchuria, the Liao­
tung and Shantung peninsulas, capturing Dairen, Port Arthur
and Chinchow. Other forces captured the Pescadores Islands
. , 21 south oi Japan proper.
20snnis, c>jD. cit., p. 278; Porter, op. cit., pp. 132-133. 
21
Yanaga, op. cit., pp. 2lpLj_-2kg; Porter, op. cit., pp. 
133-138. —  --- " — "*
18
the Qhlm-ae unsuoc m ®fully aought the Intervention of 
Ore at Britain and Hus j© la to and the war. VIoeroy Li tamn 
attested to negotiate peace bcru$ through a Oertmn named 
Detring who was employed in the Chines® Customs* Service* The 
Japanese* refused to deal with anyone other fc;mn a nigh rank* 
ii%£ Chinese official with full powers to negotiate a peace*
I,i was therefore dispatched to Japan to discuss a peace set­
tlement. Cn March 23$ 189$# four d&yc after hie arrival at 
Shtmomaeki# a Japanese made is attempt on Ll*s l.lf©. This 
I m W e n t  great It embarrassed th© Japanese Oovernment and also 
tended to weaken th© Tokyo Government's position* &evertU*"» 
less » on March 30* IS95# 11 agreed to immediate surrender and 
on April 17th* signed the Treaty of shiaonoaekl* ***~
Hornbaek aptly su^arissd China*s humiliating defeat 
when ho wrote 5
Tao ar cst# the older 1, the most populous o .✓. try 
in the <* .* *1 i# a huge e >rtinental empire long ao^ *toned
to astea.n Itself the ©ole repos itory of national 
strength 4auJ aubet&nse was defeated in war and invaded 
by the arseJ force© of a little insular neighbor**^
Dy the terns of the treaty* China agreed to recognise 
the Independence of Korea j to cede to Japan the Liaotung penin­
sula * Formosa and the Feecadorea; to pay an Indemnity of
fc4UYanaga, m* Mi** PP* £i|.5-146.
^Hornback, 0£# cit* » p* vll*
200,000,003 taels; to open .four new treaty ports to Japanese 
trade and residence; to cone lade a new treaty of c a u w c a ,
i j
granting to Japan the status of a most-favored-nati on.w
The other Western nations were both surprised and alarm­
ed at Japan1 s success against what had been thought of as a 
mighty nation* Russia, joined by .France and Germany made a 
demand that Japan retrocede the Liaotung Peninsula to China 
on the grounds that such a position would threaten China and 
Korea and disturb the peace of the Far East* The Japanese, 
rather than face war or lose any other benefits, yielded to the 
demands of the three nations on Hay 5, 1895 and four days lat­
er, th© ratification of the treaty took place* The Japanese 
were particularly embittered by the intervention and would long 
remember this in future wars with Russia and Germany* The 
Western Powers In turn, saw China*a defeat as a golden opportun­
ity to press for concessions in a vast land heretofore consider-
2p
ed a “sleeping dragon” that should not be disturbed*
After expelling the 0hine.se from Korea, the Japanese 
soon learned that they would now have to deal with Russia* By 
the terms of a Convention signed on May 13, I896, both Russia and
^Steiger, op* cit*, pp. 626-627; Clyde, op. cit., p. 302* 
2<
^Treat, Japan and the United States, pp* 133-139;
Yanaga, o£* cit*, pp. 1357f,252,
Japan gained the right to station 800 troops each in Seoul as 
a legation guard force. A year later, Russian 'military and 
financial advisors were attached to the Korean Court. In 
order to counterbalance the growth of Russian influence, the 
Nipponese secured the right to guard the Japanese-built tele­
graph lines between Pusan and Seoul; this was followed by
26permission to build a railroad between these two cities.
On April 25, 1898, the Nlahi-Rosen Protocol, while reassert­
ing the independence of Korea, pledged both Russia and Japan 
not to take any action concerning the nomination of financial 
and military advisors to the Korean Court without a prior 
mutual agreement. ‘Russia also recognized the right of Japan 
to develop industrial and commercial relationships with 
Karoa.~ ^
China did not obtain the intervention of the European 
Powers on her behalf without cost. Shortly after the end of 
the Slno-Japanese 'War, Prance secured a revision in her favor 
of the Sino-Annamesa frontier and ratification of a Franco- 
Chinesa boundary convention. Franc© ana Russia also made a 
par cent loan to China in order that th© latter might pay 
her war indemnity to Japan. Russia obtained an important
21
concession when she was given the right to build the Chinese
Eastern Raiiroad as a connecting link to the Trans-Siberian
Railroad. By the terms of the Li-Lobanov Treaty, the Russians
virtually gained control over the entire railroad zone extend-
23ing across northern Manchuria,
Germany, without success, tried to gain the cession of 
a Chinese port by diplomatic means. Her opportunity to make a 
demand for territory came following the murder of a German 
priest in 1897* In a treaty signed on March 6, 1393, Germany 
was granted a ninety-nine year lease to the port city of 
Tslngtao and two hundred square miles of territory surrounding 
the Kiaoehow Bay,*^ A few weeks later, on March 27th, China 
granted to Russia a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur to­
gether with 1,300 square miles of land with the right to build 
a railroad connection from Port Arthur to the Chinese Eastern 
and Trans-Siberian RaiIroad
The United States became concerned over these scrambles 
for territory in China and on September 6, 1899, Secretary Hay
sent his 15open door!t notes to Great Britain, Germany and Rus­
sia; these were followed by similiar notes to Japan, Italy,
Clyde, o£. oit., pp. 310-311.
*"^Treat, The Far £ast, pp. 326-328,
3%bid., p. 329.
and franco» The notes asked for equal commercial opportunity 
within the various apharos of influence in China. The re­
plies to the notos wore guarded and vague; Russia rejected 
the proposal while Great Britain conditioned her acceptance 
on simtllar assent by the other powers. Actually little was 
gained by the notes since Washington was not willing to sup-
31
port her diplomacy with military action.
This steady Influx of foreigners into China led to an 
increasing number of ant I.-foreign outbreaks. A Chines© 
nationalist group, known as the I Ho Ohuan or 11 Plata of Right­
eous Harmony,*1 called nBoxersw by the Europeans, Instigated 
a series of attacks on trio foreign settlements and the pro- 
Western Chinese OhrIstIans• T m j  gained several initial suc­
cesses and received the support of the Dowager Empress, who 
issued the following proclamation:
I command that all f >reignars, men, women and 
children, old and young, be summarily executed. Let 
no on© escape so that my Empire may be purged of 
thin noisome- source of oorruption^$nd that peace may 
bo restored to my loyal subjects .3^ '
In June of 1900, the Boxers attacked the foreign legations in
Poking and only the joint intervention of dapanes©, European
and American troops prevented the annllhation of the dlplo-
^Griswold, op. oit., pp. 74-36.
3^J. 0. P. Bland and L. Deckhouse, China Under the Lm- 
prasa Dowager Tzu Shi (London: William no I n© man n,'' Ypl 3T,’ p. 2
33mat!c personnel*
The Boxer uprisings provided Russia with the excuse 
for extending military control throughout Manchuria* Follow­
ing the agreement of the Boxer Protocol of September 7# 1901 
by which China agreed to pay heavy indemnities to the nations 
whose nationals had been attacked by the rioters, Russia at­
tempted to conclude a separate military agreement with Peking 
that would confirm her new control of Manchuria* Only after 
the strong intervention of the other treaty powers was Russia 
finally forced, on April 8, 1902, to agree to evacuate Man-
CHAPTER III
PRELUDE TO THE MAR
On January 30, 1902, Nippon signed a treaty of alliance 
with Great Britain, This alliance was destined to have a 
marked effect upon the foreign relations of Japan for the fol­
lowing twenty years. There was no precedent In Nipponese for­
eign relations for such an alliance and the cabinet ministers 
and political advisors to the Emperor were divided in opinion
as to whether Japan should undertake such an alliance or to
1attempt to reach an understanding with Russia. Both the Tokyo 
Government and Great Britain were afraid that Russian advances
in Manchuria, If allowed to continue unchecked, would threaten
?
their interests in North China and the Yangtze Talley. On 
the other hand, Marquis Ito and Marquis Inouye, both elder 
statesmen of considerable Influence, felt that a direct rap­
prochement with Russia would be a more practicable solution
and they were not fully sympathetic to the idea of an arrange-
3ment with the British.
The negotiations leading to the alliance were prompted
^Ishii Kikujiro, Diplomatic Commentaries {Baltimores 
Johns Hopkins University fress,' 1^3o), pp. 35> ^9.
2Yanaga, op, cit., p. 295*
3ishii, op. cit., p. 2*3 ,
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by a visit of the Gorman Charge <31 affaires, Baron von Edkhard- 
stein, to th© Japanese Minister at London, Hayashi Tadasu.
The Gorman diplomat suggested that his country, Japan and Eng­
land join together in an alliance for the purpose of maintain­
ing the balance of power in the Far East. The alliance was to 
be th© Far Eastern counterpart of the Triple Alliance, giving 
Japan a free hand in Korea. In the ©vent of a war involving 
on© of th© parties, the other parties would remain neutral un­
less a third party came to the assistance of th© enemy at 
which time the remaining two allied nations would intervene
The Tokyo Government decided to explore the possibil­
ity of undertaking such an alliance and at the same time sound 
out St. Petersburg on reaching an acceptable agreement. Haya­
shi conferred with the British F'oreign Secretary, Lord Lands- 
downe, on April 17th, 1901, and was encouraged to think that 
a British alliance might be secured. Actual negotiations, 
however, did not officially commence until the following Geto-
rf
be t S
Marquis Ito, with the approval of the Japanese Govern­
ment, visited Russia in a private capacity in November of 1901, 
in an attempt to negotiate an understanding. Ito first visit­
ed the United States where he received an honorary degree
^Ishii, pp. cit., p. 37; Yanaga, op. cit., p. 293.
g
^Yanaga, ojd. cit.. p. 300.
from Yale University on the occasion of its bicentennial cel­
ebration in October of 1901* The elder statesman then con­
tinued on to Paris where he briefly talked with Minister 
Hayashi who showed him a draft of a proposed alliance treaty 
submitted by the British Government. From Paris, Ito went on 
to St. Petersburg where he conferred with the Tsar, Foreign 
Minister Lamsdorff and Finance Minister Witte* During tne 
discussions the Japanese leader made the following proposals 
as a basis for an understanding between Japan and Russia:
(!) A reciprocal guarantee of the independence 
of Korea*
(2) A reciprocal guarantee not to use any part of 
Korea for strategic purposes nor to take military 
measures along the Korean coast which would hamper 
freedom of passage'through the straits.
(3) Russia to recognize Japan’s freedom of action 
in political, commercial and Industrial matters in 
Korea* Japan would also have the exclusive right to 
assist the Korean Government in Its internal operation 
and if necessary, to dispatch troops.
The Russians, however, were unwilling to agree to such terms
and Ito left for Berlin where he awaited the completion of
7the Anglo-Japanese negotiati ons, The British, in the mean­
while, learned of Ito’s visit to Russia and decided to speed 
up their negotiations in order to forestall any agreement be­
tween Japan and Russia, The British and Japanese by now had 
agreed not to invite Germany to participate in the alliance
2?
talks due to the growing hostility of the British people to­
ward Germany. Furthermore, Japan had no real basis for reach­
ing an understanding with Germany. Marquis I to had given up 
his hopes of an agreement with Russia and on December lij.th, he 
wired his consent to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance to the For­
eign Ministry. Th© Emperor gave his approval after receiving 
a favorable report from th© Privy Council and th© document
was signed for their respective governments by Lord Landsdown©
3
and Mr. Hayashi on January 30, 1902.
Th® new treaty provided that the two nations would "up­
hold the status quo and general peace In the extreme East.11 
Th© two nations pledged themselves to support the "independence 
and Integrity of the Empire of China and Korea," and promised 
to maintain "equality of opportunity for commerce and industry 
of all nations." Perhaps more Important were the defensive 
arrangements which provided that if either Japan or Great Brit­
an, in defense of its Interests, became involved in war with 
another power, the other party would remain neutral. However, 
if a fourth or other po\*ers joined in the hostilities, both
parties to th© Alliance pledged themselves to make war in 
9common.
On April 8, 1902, Russia and China signed a convention
^Isliii, op. cit., pp. 1 fanaga, op. cit., p. 301.
^Ishii, op. clt., pp. 328—329*
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by which Russia agreed to w.tthdraw from Manchuria, Three
zones within Manchuria were defined and th© withdrawal was
to be staged over three six-month periods with the entire
evacuation scheduled to be completed not later than October 
10
3, 1903* The first step in the evacuation was completed as 
scheduled but th© withdrawn troops were merely relocated in 
the second 2one or at Port Arthur. During the second evacua­
tion period, th© troops were moved to the Korean border where 
Russia had forestry concessions along the Yalu River area, 
further pretense of evacuation was halted by Russia on April 
18, 1903 and demands were mad© upon China for concessions
which, if granted, would establish a virtual Russian protecto-
11
rate over all Manchuria and Mongolia*
The Japanese became alarmed when Russia failed to evac­
uate Manchuria as provided in th© agreement of April 8th and, 
at a meeting held before the throne on Jun.© 23, 1903, it was 
decided to approach Russia regarding the matter. On August 
12, 1903, Ambassador Kuri.no delivered a note to Mr, Lamsdorff 
in which the following proposals were made:
(1) Mutual engagement to respect the independence 
and territorial integrity of the Chinese and Korean
10Manehurlan Treaties and Agreements (Washingtons Carne 
gie Endowment f or'Tniernati orial Peace, 1921), pp. 65-63,
1XT:c-eat, The Par East, p. 366,
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-Empires and to maintain the principles of equal oppor­
tunity for the commerce and industry of all nations in 
these c o m  tries*
{2) Reciprocal recognition of Japan1a preponderating 
interests in Korea and Russia*s special interests in 
railway enterprises in Manchuria, and of the right of 
Japan to take in Korea and of Russia to take in nanohu­
rl a such measures as may be necessary for the protection 
of their respective Interests as above defined, subject, 
however, to the provisions of Article 1 of this Agreement*
(3) Reciprocal undertaking on the part of Russia and 
Japan not to impede development of those industrial and 
commercial activities of Japan in Korea and of Russia in 
Manchuria, which are not inconsistent with the stipula­
tions of Article 1 of this Agreement*
Additional engagement on the part of Russia not to 
impede the eventual extension of the Korean Railway into 
Southern Manchuria so as to connect with the East China 
and Shanhaikwan-Newchwang lines*
(L;) Reciprocal engagement that in case it is found 
necessary to send troops by Japan to Korea, or by Russia 
to Manchuria, for hie purpose either of protecting the 
interests mentioned in Article 2 of this Agreement, or 
of suppressing insurrection or disorder calculated to 
create international complications, the troops so sent 
are to be forthwith recalled as soon as their missions 
are accomplished*
(5) Recognition on the part of Russia of the exclu­
sive right of Japan to give advice and assistance includ- 
irig necessary mi 1 i iary assistance *
(6) This Agreement to supplant all previous arrange­
ments between Japan and Russia respectin'-: Korea.
Russia countered with a series of delaying tactics and 
did not make a reply to the note until October 3rd, by which 
time she announced that the subject of China and Manchuria 
were removed from the discussions* On October 30th, the Jap­
anese then submitted a counter proposal insisting upon China
12, ihe Far hast, pp. 3&9~3?0*
being included in the negotiations• In subsequent proposals, 
Japan agreed that Manchuria was outside of her sphere of in­
terests provided that Russia respected the Integrity of China 
and Korea# When a reply was not received to the note dated 
January 13* 19014., the Japanese became convinced that further 
negotiations were useless and it was decided to terminate the
negotiations and sever diplomatic relations--a step that ulti­
ll
rnstely led to war*
The first hostilities in the Russo-Japanese War took 
place on February 8, 19Qq when a fleet of ten Japanese destroy­
ers suddenly attacked Russian ships anchored near Port Arthur* 
The following day, th© Japanese engaged a. Russian cruiser and 
gunboat outside the harbor of Chemulpo in Korea and success­
fully put them both out of action* The port was then employed 
for the debarkation of Japanese troops on the mainland* Two 
days later, on February 10th, Tokyo officially declared war on 
Russia.
The Japanese gained military superiority from the very 
outset of the war and easily overran Korea* On February 23rd, 
about 350,000 Russian troops faced 1^00,000 Japanese along a
11Takouchi Tatsujl, War and Diplomacy in bhe Japanese 
ihapire (hew York: Doubleday, Doran and Co*, 19351, pp.' 157-
Tlil; Treat, Japan and th© Uni tad States, p, l30; Treat, The
Far hast, pP7 “37I-I72.“  —  —  —
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front of over I4.0 miles, near the city of Mukden* After two 
weeks of incessant fighting and th© combined less of over 
130,000 casualties, the Japanese occupied Mukden and forced
id
the Russians to withdraw to Harbin* Port Arthur surrendered 
on January 2, 1905 after a siege of several months during which 
Japanese losses were extremely heavy* By hay, the Russians 
suffered further defeats at the lain River, Kincliau and N&u- 
shan* The coup de grace was administered when the Russian 
Baltic Fleet, ©nrout© to Vladivostok, wan defeated on May 28th 
by Admiral Togo while passing through the Tsushima Straits.
The Russians lost six battleships, six cruisers, five destroy­
ers and five other ships* Throe ships were captured and three
others managed to escape. Nearly 12,000 Russian sailors went
16
down with thoir ships in this historic naval battle*
Early in 1905, with both nations showing signs of war 
weariness, the, first steps had been taken to bring th© fighting 
to an end. Premier Delo&ss^f of France offered to mediate in 
peace talks between the two belligerents and at tho same time, 
Cecil Spring-Rica, Councillor to the British Embassy at Saint 
Petersburg, was invited to present his views in Washington on 
Russian conditions. Both the Japanese and Russian Governments
15 _
j. P. 0. Puller, Mill tary Hi ctory of tho We3tern.
World (New York: Punk and Wagnails* Co. ,195-7) 9 III. pp. ~lh2~
X 63 #
i o
'Puller, op* cit** p. 1651 Yanaga, op* cit*, pp. 303-309
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asked the United States to intercede and on June 0, 1905» iden­
tical notes were dispatched to the two governments formally in-
17vitimr then to participate in a peace conference,
A few mo at hs p r i ox* t a the pe see- t* Ik invitat ions , the 
British Government negotiated the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese 
Alliance. Both nations were confident of the ultimate victory 
of the Kipponese in the war and Great Britain desired to pre­
vent any possible rapproe he me n t at'the end of the struggle be­
tween Hues is. and Japan. Under the terms of the renewal, Japan 
recognized Great Britain* s special interests * In all that con­
cerns the security of the Indian Frontier,” as a quid pro quo 
for British recognition of Japan’s "paramount political, mili­
tary and economic interesta" in Korea. The terms of the origin­
al alliance were also modified to provide that either party of 
the alliance would coma to the aid of the other if attacked by 
a third party. It was further agreed that the attack or threat 
of attack need not origin*is In the Par East. The treaty was
signed on August 12th and published on September 27, 1305,
10
prior to the conclusion of the Treaty of Portsmouth. While 
the Japanese considered the revised treaty as symbolic of a new 
concept of mutual defense of territorial rights, the Russian
17Ennis, op. cit., p. 288; Y&naga, op. cit., p. 310.
18
G. P. Gooch and Harold Temper ley, {e d . British 
Documents on the Origins of the War, 1093-191U (London: H.M.
Stationery 0ffice~'~r 1929), IV, pp. 161^-165* (Hereafter cited 
as British .Documents).
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Government considered the treaty as being directed against
19its position, in the iPar hast#
The peace negotiations commenced at a conference held 
in Portsmouth, Hew Hampshire 0:1 August 10, 1905* President 
Theodore Roosevelt took a leading role, (which he obviously 
enjoyed}, in conducting the day-to-day negotiations and in 
the drafting of the treaty* The two enemy nations came to 
an impasse over th® issue of payment of an indemnity by Rus­
sia to Japan* President Roosevelt, unknown to the Nipponese, 
learned that th© Russians might be willing to give Japan the 
southern half of Sakhalin in lieu of a money indemnity. The 
President cajoled the Japanese into accepting this proposal 
and th© treaty was signed on September 1905• In addition 
to ceding the southern half of Sakhalin to Japan, Russia ac­
knowledged the Tokyo Governmentfs paramount political, mili­
tary and economic interests in Korea and agreed not to inter­
vene in the measures of control and guidance taken in that 
country. Manchuria was to be returned to Chinese control ex­
cept that the leasehold on the Liaotung Peninsula, together 
with the ownership of the South Manchurian Railway and control 
over the railroad zone, was to be transferred to Japan subject
19
Ishll, op. cit., p. Sh» British Documents, IV, p. 203*
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to tno consent of the Gninese Government. The terms of the 
peace treaty, while agreed to by th© Imperial Government of 
Japan, were not readily accepted by the Japanese people who 
felt that Russia should have been required to pay an Indemni­
ty. Severe riots broke out in several Japanese cities and it
21
was soma time before the people were quiet aga in.
Following the ratification of the Treaty of Portsmouth, 
Baron Komira was dispatched to Peking where e new treaty ef­
fecting the transfer of the Russian leasehold in llano hurl a to 
Japan was signed. Nippon now gained an undisputed foothold on
the mainland of Asia and virtually a carte blanche to absorb
2.2
Korea within her growing Empire.
Following the Russo-Japanese war, France sought to bet­
ter her relations with Japan. Her extensive holdings in 
French Indo-Ohina made such action necessary as she was afraid 
of Japanese retaliation for her permitting Russian naval ves­
sels to use supply facilities in Madagascar and at Camranh 
during the war, A Franco-Japanese agreement was signed on
£0*" Siting E. Horison (ed.), The Letters of Theodore 
Roosevelt (Cambridge: Harvard University fr'ess, 1'bpXy, '"fv, pp.
XyoT-XJSJ; Xshii, on. oit., pp. 65-69; Harley F, Mackair and 
Donalc F. Each, ModernH^ar hast Internallon&l Relations (Hew 
York: D, Van Hostrund Co. ,  i55077~~P* 153*
21■“Is hi I, on. cit., pp. 69-70.
tel W. Willoughby, Foreign Rights and Interests 
in China (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, X52f>77PP7
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June 10, 190?, After th© traditional acknowledgements of the 
Independence of China, the signatories announced that they 
would support each other in maintaining ”peace and security 
in those regions with a view to maintaining the respective
not delimited, the provinces of Kw&ntung, Kwangoi and Yunnan
hien Province, Manchuria and Mongolia.
The French treaty was followed by a far more Important 
entente with. Hassle. On July 30, 1907, the two nations agreed 
to recognize the integrity of China and "the principle of 
equal opportunity in whatever concerns the couimerc© and indus­
try of all nations in that empire, and engage to sustain and 
defend the maintenance of th® status quo and respect for this 
principle by all pacific means within their r e a c h . I n  an 
additional secret convention, the two powers established in 
Manchuria a line running north and south over wnich. each 
would not; encroach. Russia recognized Japan* s interests in 
Korea while Hippon gave similiar assurances to Russia’s
Although the spheres of interests were
2^
«
C oneerrilny 
Press, 1921
_d Ayr©©ments 
Oxford Uni-With and  grai , 
versity s, u
^Willoughby, op. cit., pp. 31q~31.5«
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interests In Outer Mongolia.
In an effort to ease growing tensions between the Unit­
ed States and Japan, Secretary of State Blihu Root and Ambas­
sador Takahira exchanged notes on November 30, 1908, which 
aet forth their joint policy in the Par Past, The two govern­
ments promised the maintenance of the atatus quo in the Far 
East and each agreed to respect the territorial rights of the 
other and support the ”independence and integrity of China*” 
Actually, Japan interpreted the Root-Takahira notes as tanta­
mount to American acceptance of her treaties with France,
Russia and England and the recognition and acceptance of her
27special position. In China and Korea.
In August of 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea. The
first step in this direction was taken in 1905 when the To­
kyo Government announced the establishment of a protectorate 
over Korea. Two years later, th© Korean King dispatched a 
secret mission to the Second Hague Conference in an attempt 
to gain the freedom of his country. His efforts were unsuc­
cessful and as a result, he was forced to abdicate in favor
of his son. The Nipponese thereupon initiated complete
26Merebith E* Cameron, Georg© E* MeReynolds and Thomas 
H* D. Mahoney, China, Japan and the Powers (New York: Th©
Ronald Press, 19525> F* 555.
^^Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China,
1 8 9 6 -1 9 1 9 7 T 7 T .~ 7 5 9 7 --------------------------------------------------------
*.
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control over Internal as well &e foreign relation®. The Ko­
rean people quite naturally resented the presence of the 
Japanese in their country and scti.vcly opposed the program 
of th© Japanese Resident General In Korea, Prince Ito# When 
he was assassinated on October 26, 1909 at Harbin by a Ko­
rean fanatic, the Japanese public clamored for annexation of 
Korea* ,4c the Tokyo Government had already gained wide rec­
ognition of her special position In Korea, the annexeti on
pa
was carried out with little difficulty on August 22, 1Q10*
Tho Anglo-Japan©s© Alliance was renewed for the last 
time on July 13, 1911* Actually, the alliance m s  no longer 
as popular as a decade before* Strong anti-Japanese senti­
ments bad developed among the people of the British Domin­
ions and even In. England. In Japan too, there had been a 
change In attitude, touched off by the British criticism of 
Nippon’s policy in China, Havertholes*, th# leaders of both 
governments fait that the continuation of th© alliance would 
serve to check against both Germany and Russia* The British 
Got,eraaic-nt, however, found 5.tself In a delicate position in 
that by the terms of the alliance, she was obligated to aid 
Tokyo In th© ©vent of a war between Japan and th© united
^Eenry Chung, Korean Trestles (Hew Yortet H* S, 
Michols, Inc., 1919), i>p • ^S^SSS'jTTS'tone th Scott La tour© t to,
A Short History of the Far Fast (Mew York: Th® Macmillan Co.,
T 9 J ^ P ? T 5 i S t 5 I 5 | T i w , - ^ r  cit., pp. 3U3-3U5.
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States. This issue was neatly solved by the addition of a
saving clause which read?
Article IV* Should wither High Contracting Party 
conclude a treaty of general arbitration with a 
third Power, It is agreed that nothing in this Agree­
ment shall entail upon such Contracting Party an ob­
ligation to go to war with the Powgr with whom such 
treaty of arbitration Is In force*2^
The revised agreement also omitted any further refer­
ences to Korea, Britain’s Indian Frontier, or th© Russo- 
Japanese War| otherwise it was substantially the same as the 
previous agreement signed in 1905?*
On July if., 1910, Russia and Japan signed a convention 
by which they agreed to eliminate the competition between 
their railroad lines In Manchuria. Each agreed to maintain 
the political and economic status quo In Manchuria and con­
sult with each other in the event the status quo was threat- 
30
©ned.
Two years later, in March of 1912, both Tokyo and St. 
Petersburg business interests were invited to join a Four- 
Power group of American, French, German and English bankers 
in forraing a syndicate to arrange a loan of 10 million pounds 
to China. The loan would be used for currency reform and
^Ishil, ojd. cit., pp. 333.
-^Treaties and Agreements With and Concerning China. 
i898-i9i97T7"p7"mgT--------------------- -----
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the Industrial development of the Three Eastern Provinces In
Manchuria# The other Powers had originally excluded Japan
and Russia and only admitted them to the Con sort!-urn after
31the two nations made strong objections to China* The two 
former enemy nations drew closer together following their 
united stand against the Four-Power Consortium and on July 8, 
1912, Japan and Russia signed a treaty at St* Petersburg con­
firming the provisions of the secret conventions of 1907 and 
321910.
In summary, during the decade from 1902 to 1912, Kippon
gained important concessions and alliances which demonstrated 
her leading position in the Far East* Th© Anglo-Japanese Alli­
ance secured her against encroachments by Russia and Germany 
and provided a powerful ally In Great Britain, whom she would 
later be called upon to aid during World War 1* The defeat of 
Russia in 1905 demonstrated Japan1s military might and assist­
ed her In obtaining legal recognition of har demand for con­
cessions In Manchuria and elsewhere on the mainland of Asia*
The several agreements with European Powers, plus the Root- 
Takahira Notes of 1908 provided Japan with implied recognition
•^Clyde, op* cl t *, pp*
■^Ernest Batson Price, The Busao-Japan©ae Treaties of 
1907-1916 Concerning Manchuria and Mongolia (Baltlmorel “tE@ 
cToIin s T o p  kins Press 7 I93JJ7 PP#T7-96
ko
of her special position in Korea which she ultimately incor­
porated Into the Japanese Empire in 1910* Finally, the unit­
ed stand of Russia and japan against th© Four Power Consor­
tium demonstrated a new closeness of relations between these 
two nations which served as a warning to the West that neither 
Russia nor Japan intended to relinquish control over Manchuria 
and Mongolia to outside powers*
CHAPTER IV
SINO-JAPANESE RELATIONS AMD THE WAR YEARS
There were no major problems In international rela- 
tions between China and Japan during the first half of the 
nineteenth century* Indeed, China's policy towards all for­
eign nations was marked by the principle of _i shih t1 ung Jen, 
or lsto treat all with the same kindness. The opening 
of Japan and the growth of Western influence in China however, 
worked changes* These were demonstrated by China's defeat in 
the Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895* after which China faced
a constant demand for concessions from both the European Pow-
2©rs and ner neighbor, Japan.
A decree on February 12, 1912, signed by the Dowager 
Empress Lung Yu, in her capacity as Regent, abolished the 
Mancha rule in favor of a republican form of government. The 
entire country had been seething in revolt for over a year 
and although the Manehu leaders had mad® belated attempts at 
reform, the old order failed to reestablish popular confidence. 
The Japanese Government at first sided with the monarchy and 
hoped for a joint Ang 1 o-Js.panese intervention under the
^Shuhsi Hsu, An Introduction to S1no-Foreign Relations 
{Shanghai: Kelly and Walsh, Limited, I94I), "p." 37.'
(• oL^r tw
Alliance with London* The British, however, were reluc­
tant to take action against tne revolutionary elements as 
they controlled the Yangtze area where English interests were 
extensive. The revolutionary leader, Sun Yat Sen, was elected 
President of trie Chinese Provisional Government but proved 
unable to maintain control and was forced to flee to Japan. 
Yuan Shih-kai, the head of the conservative and constitution­
alist element, succeeded Sun fat Sen and became President of 
3
China. The first years of the new republic were marked by 
confusion and disunity which played directly into the hands 
of the Japanese and Western Powers seeking to extend and 
strengthen their growing economic footholds
As World War I began, on August 191*4-# the French 
Minister to Japan proposed that Nippon and France conclude a 
treaty of alliance. The proposal was later amended to pro­
vide for France to become a member of the Anglo-Japanese Alli­
ance. Membership in the Alliance was desired by the Paris 
Government in order to safeguard interests in French Indo-Chi- 
na* A week later, Russia made a similiar overture .for parti­
cipation in a tripartite alliance, neither Sir Edward Grey 
nor Foreign Minister Rato wanted tne two other nations to join
iinruLS , op. cit., p. 1 kg..
t,
‘'hlsu, China and her Political Entity, pp. 3^3-349*
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the Alliance since it would serve to dilute its effectiveness.
As an alternative to these proposals, Japan was invited to
adhere to the Declaration of London of September 4? 1914•
This was accomplished in October of 1915 when Japan, along
with the other parties to the declaration, agreed not to make
a separate peace and to consult with the other parties on all
peace proposals
The British Ambassador at Tokyo, Sir C« Greene, advised
th© Japanese Government on August 3rd that Britain would rely
upon her help in the event the British concessions at Hong
Kong and he!-hai-wei were threatened* The Japanese Government
replied that it would consider such an attack as sufficient
6
basis to invoke action under the Anglo-*Japanese Alliance*
Sir Edward Grey then dispatched a message in which he thanked 
the Japanese Government for their offer of assistance and ex­
pressed the hope that Nippon1a involvement in tho war would
7not be necessary* However, after war was declared, the Brit­
ish attitude underwent a change* The British plan called for 
the seizure of the German wireless stations in New Guinea, Yap 
and Nauru by the 'Australian Navy* The Australian Government
g
"ishii, op# cit*, pp* 101-103; Yanaga, op* cit* B p. 356. 
^British Documents, XI, p. 293*
'’ibid., p. 329.
now felt that the Gentian Pacific Fleet, under Admiral von 
Spee should be destroyed prior to any attack on the German 
island possessions. The British and Dominion Naval Forces 
could not undertake such an operation without additional ships 
and on August ?th, the British Government formally asked Japan 
to "hunt out and destroy the armed German merchant cruisers." 
The request went on to say, "this of course means an act of 
war against Germany, but this is, in our opinion, unavoidable.” 
Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the Japanese pub­
lic had shown but little interest in tho affairs of Europe, 
However, the newspapers throughout the nation now took up the 
war cause and reminded the Japanese people of the part Ger­
many played in the Triple Intervention of 1895; of Nippon’s
obligations under the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; and of 3@r-
9many’s threat to neutral shipping in th© Far East. Three 
courses were now open, to Japan, namely, to remain neutral, 
to join the Central Powers, or to join the Allies. While 
some of the Elder Statesmen felt that Germany might possibly 
win th© war. Baron Kato made 'a strong plea for participation 
in the conflict as a token of Japan* s friendship for England.
The cabinet, on August 8th, decided to enter the war and to
demand not only th© surrender of German ships in the Pacific
10waters, but also th® surrender of the Kiaochow leasehold.
Actually, the Tokyo Government did not feel that it had a
legal obligation to enter the war under the terms of the Alii
ance, nevertheless, it welcomed the "opportunity to destroy
the German influence from Eastern. Asia and to enhance the
11prestige of Japan.u The British Government feared that
the Inclusion of Kiaochow in the Japanese military action
would involve China and perhaps effect England’s commercial
interests In her concession areas. bond on therefore asked
Tokyo, on August 11th, to postpone all military action and
1 Pwithdrew Its request for assistance. The Japanese Govern­
ment replied that war had already been decided upon and that 
there was a general widespread popular demand for revenge 
against Germany. The reply went on to say that Japan did not
harbor any territorial ambitions nor would its entry into the
13war effect British tra.de* Grey now reversed, his previous 
stand and on August 13th, be agreed to a Japanese ultimatum
k-G
to Germany for the surrender of armed vessels and the ICiao- 
ehow leasehold but asked Nippon to confine herself 11 to the 
German Base and neighboring Chinese seas.1 ^  Two days later, 
the Japanese Government Issued an ultimatum to the German Gov­
ernment using phraseology slmiliar to that used by Germany 
in 1095 when she demanded that Japan renounce her claim to the 
Liaotung Peninsula:
(1) To withdraw immediately from the Japanese and 
Chinese waters German men-of-war and armed vessels of 
all kinds and to disarm at one© those that cannot be 
so withdrawn,
(2) To deliver on a date not later than September 
15# 1911i* to the Imperial Japanese authorities without 
condition or compensation the entire leased territory 
of Kiaochow, with a^view to eventual restoration of 
the same to China,^
The German Government was given until noon on August
23rd to signify her acceptance of the terms, otherwise, the
Japanese Government would be free to take such action as it
16deemed necessary to meet the situation* In the meantime, 
in an effort to limit Japan*s role, the British Government 
issued the following statement;
The Governments of Great Britain and Japan having 
been In communication with each other are of opinion 
that it is necessary for each to take action to
^■MacNair and Lach, op* cit*, p* 177•
1 -■^Ldwin A, Falk, From ferry to Pearl JIarbor (New York;
Doubleday, Doran and Oo.l 19kJ) > P• """^ iB’; Mactair' and Lach,
op* cit*, p. 178.
18~?MacNair and Lach, op* pit*, p, 179.
hrl
protect the general interests in the Far East contem­
plated by the Anglo-Japanese .Alliance . . .  It is un­
derstood that the action of Japan will not extend to 
the Pacific Ocean beyond the China Seas, except in so 
far as It may be necessary to protect Japanese ship­
ping lanes in the Pacific, nox- beyond Asiatic waters 
westward of the Chins Seas, nor to any foreign terri­
tory except territory in occupation on the
continent of eastern Asia *
In an effort to allay suspicion of Japan's motives, 
Premier Ckuma issued the following public statements
. * * Japan has no ulterior motive, no desire to 
secure more territory, no thought of depriving China 
or other people of anything which they now possess.
The Government and my people have given their word 
and their pledge which will be honored end kept as 
Japan always keeps promises
Upon learning of Japan's preparations to enter the war, 
China mad© a. last minute attempt to cede the German leasehold 
at Tsingtao to the United States for immediate transfer back 
to China. However, Secretary Lansing replied to this sugges­
tion that "it would be quixotic In the extreme to allow the 
question of China*s territorial integrity to entangle the 
United States in international difficulties."^ She way had 
now been paved for the Tokyo Government to enter the conflict 
with international recognition of her course of action in 
China•
1 * Clyde, o p , c 11 ., p. itl9.
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Robert Young, ”Japan at Ki&ochow and the Peace Con­
ference,” The Contemporary Review, CXV (March, 1919)* p. 281.
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Foreign Relations of the United States, 1911t» Supple- 
merit (Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
19221 , p . l?p.
Japan declared war on Germany following the expiration 
of her ultimatum on August 23, 1914# Tokyo1 a major mi 11 tary
role during the war waa the capture of Taingtac, (and brief
mention will be made of this campaign as well as soma of the
other military actions in which Japan participated}® Klao-
ehow ia situated on the eastern extremity of the Shantung
peninsula* Tsingtao, 'the capital city, was the site of the
German administratlve center for the leased territory which
comprised approximately 200 square miles. The Germans spent
a considerable sura of money in constructing modern facilities
and in improving the Kiaoehow Bay which had one of the finest
20
natural harbors in the Orient.'-’ German defense forces were 
divided into land and w a  defenses with, the land forces being 
charged with protection against attack from the north* The 
principal line of defense consisted of five organised tactical 
infanter1ewerke , each with from two to three hundred men* To 
the rear of these forts were about $0 heavy 37 mm* machine 
guns for close defense of the positions® Heavy batteries were 
located on'the hills for both land and sea defense* The Ger­
man forces consisted of about 3*300 regular troops which were 
suppiemen ted by 1,200 reservists who had been called to active
^ %Tancis J, Reynolds, Allen L* Churchill and Francis 
T* Killer, The S tory of the Great War (New York: ?. F*
Co111ar and Bon, t s i 677 m ,- w r i t f - w .
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duty from, their homes scattered all over the Far Last•
The Japanese plan called for an expeditionary force 
under the command of Lieutenant General Kamlo, consisting of 
the 13th Independent Division, reinforced by artillery and 
support troops. An additional force of 1,369 British troops 
from the British garrisons in forth China was attached to the 
Japanese forces. The Nipponese troops landed at Lungkow on 
September 2, 191i|, and marched 200 miles overland to Tsingt&o. 
The port at Laoshan was later utilized since It was only Ip 
miles from Tsingtao. On -September 27th, the Japanese arrived 
at the outer defense posts of the city and captured Prinz 
Heinrich Hill, The Japanese were in no immediate hurry to ob­
tain. a victory since the Germans were bottled up within the 
city and had no hope of escape. A general siege began on Oc­
tober 31sfc, which was the Mikado*s birthday, and Ilf.2 heavy 
guns, joined by Japanese ships which blockaded the harbor, be« 
gan a bombardment which lasted seven days. The Germans had
expended most of their supplies and surrendered the garrison
, 22
on Hoveuber 7, IGlg, The German naval units under the
^Horner Case, "The Capture of Tsingt&u," (unpublished 
research study, The Command and General Staff School, Fort 
Leavenworth, Kansas, 1933)* pp* 6-10.
pp
““John C. Ferguson, 'Japan*s Use of her Hegemony,” 
North American He view, CCX (Oct., 1919), p. Ii-53; The Literary 
III go s t~HIs b ory of 'tne World War (Hew Yorks Funk ar73 WaSnalTs~~I9Wjttks 'TprrsB^rfu. ■
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c omasa nd of Admiral Spee managed to escape fron Ts Ingtao prior
to tbs arrival of the Japanese naval units* Admiral Spee13
fleet of four cruisers initially hid in the waters near the
Carolines; they then boldly came out from hiding and went
north, passing by Guam and the Marianas and eventually made
their way to the Falkland Islands where they were defeated
23
on December 8th,
China was greatly upset by the passage of foreign 
troops outside of the leased territory and filed a vigorous 
protest when Japanese troops seized the Shantung Hailway be­
tween Tsingtao and Tsinanfu* The Chinese Government also an­
nounced a "special” war zone to which they sought to confine 
the military operations of the belligerents, This was large­
ly ignored by th© Japanese and thus, soon withdrawn by China
2k
when it proved, impossible to make It effective.
Following; the capture of Tsingtao, the Japanese troops 
took over complete control of the leased territory, 01.' i i-J ©CO „’l— 
ber 2k* I9II4., the victors announced new provisional regulations 
for the Custom House and required that all customs documents 
be written in Japanese* Th© Japanese Government refused to 
accept any of the candidates nominated for th© post of
O "3
^Palk, op. c It *, p. 219; Porter, op, c it», p* 25k*
^G, Zay Wood, The Shantung Question (Hew York: Flem­
ing K. He veil Co., 192FJT pp. '^8-5.9 ♦
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Customs Commissioner by the Chinese Government and operated 
the service, with their own customs personnel* Finally, an 
agreement was reached on August 6, 1915 by which the Chinese 
Heritime Customs Office was reopened with the Japanese Gov­
ernment exercising all rights formerly enjoyed by the German 
29Government. ^
In addition to the campaign at Tsingtao, Nipponese 
naval units captured the German islands north of the equator, 
most of which were In the Marshall and Caroline Croups• For 
the remainder of the war, the Japanese Navy escorted .Austra­
lian and New Zealand troopships an route to the Sues Canal 
and performed, guard duty In the Pacific Ocean* Nippon re­
fused to send an ex.psditionary force to the Western Front on 
the grounds that her obligations under the Alliance could be 
beat discharged In the Far Hast. This viewpoint was somewhat 
modified in 191? when Go m a n  submarines attacked Japanese 
mex*chant vessels, Following these incidents, the Tokyo Gov­
ernment dispatched three destroyer divisions to the Mediter­
ranean where they Joined other Allied naval units In patrol 
duties*
On January 18, 1915, the Japanese Ambassador at Peking,
^Wood, op* ci_t*3 pp* 55-53*
2^Porter, o£. ci t., pp* 253-25!!*
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Mr* Hioki, presented a series of demands directly to the 
President of China. The demands had their origin in a long 
series of grievances against- China and the cancellation of 
the war zone was used as the occasion to retaliate. The de­
mands, written on Imperial War Office stationery, were pref­
aced by the statement: ” * . • our great Imperial policy de­
pends on our being able to avail ourselves of the world1s 
general trend of affairs so as to extend our influence and 
decide upon a course of action toward China which shall be 
practical in execution. « * dexrmnds were divided
Into five groups* Group I pertained to the Shantung prov­
ince and Chins was requested to agree In advance to any 'un­
derstanding which might be made between Japan and Germany in 
reference to the disposition of the Carman rights In Shan­
tung I China to promise not to cede to any third power any 
land In or along the coast of Shantung; Japan to be permit­
ted to construct a railway tc connect the KIaochow-Tsinan
network with Chefoe or Lxmgkow; certain cities and towns to
 ^ 28 
be opened as commercial centers.
Group II pertained to South Manchuria, and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia* The Chinese were asked to extend the lease
^?Brmis, on, cij;* , p. 206*
O A
’^ Willoughby, op. cl t. a pp. igL 1-1+22.
of Port Arthur, "Dr*iron and tha Antung-Hukdon Railroad to nine- 
fcy-nine years; Japans 30 subject3 to be poraifcted to lease or 
own land for both farming and oommez*eial purposes; Japanese to 
be permitted to travel or reside in South Manchuria and Eastern 
Inner Mongolia $ China to obtain the consent of Nippon before 
granting: any concessions to a third power for the construction 
of railroads; the Tokyo Government to be consulted if any 
foreign advisors required$ the control of the Kirin-Changehim 
Railroad to be given to Japan for a period of nine ty-nino 
years* These demands were probably the most Important to the 
Japs .nose since they would perpetuate their control in Couth 
Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongol!a and protect the Korean
r**
b o r d e r }
Croup III pertained to the Han-Yah-Ping Company, a Sino-
Japanese company recently nationalized by China. The Japanese
demanded that they be given joint owners hip of the company.
Such control would thereby give them access to the large min-
30oral resources owned by the company in the Yangtze area*
In Group IV, Japan requested that China not cede or 
lease to any other nation any harbor, bay or island along the 
coast of China. Finally, Group V contained a series of general
demands which were considered especially obnoxious by the
Peking Government. China was to employ influential Japanese
as advisors in political, financial and military affairs;
Japanese churches, schools and hospitals were to be given the
right to own land; propagation of the Buddhist religion in
China was to be permitted; police departments in all large
centers were to be jointly staffed by Chinese and Japanese; a
fixed amount of China1s ammunition requirements, (fifty per
cent was suggested), was to be purchased fro;. Japan or else a
SIno-Japanese arsenal was to be constructed; Nippon was to be
permitted to construct a railroad connecting Wuchang with Kiu-
kiang and Kanehang with Chaochow and Hangchow; Japan was to be
consulted before borrowing money for the purpose of working
mines, building railways and constructing harbor works or dock-
11yards in the Fukien province*
The Chinese Government revealed almost at once the na­
ture and scope of the demands to the foreign press, the diplo­
matic circles and the Chinese people. While the Chinese nation 
became violently incensed over the demands, the European Powers 
were too involved in the war to become greatly concerned over 
Issues in the Orient. The demands made an unfavorable impres-
^2*® & ties and Agreements With and Concern! 
l?19j IX 9 ™ p p T ' -1 £.35? ’Ennis', op. c it., pu S3 7.
hlna 139^
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sion upon the United States Government, particularly since 
the Tokyo Government attempted to conceal the requests con­
tained in Group V. Washington objected to the issues in this 
latter group and also considered it appropriate to make the 
following statement concerning Japanese rights in Shantung* 
South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia:
While on principle and under the treaties of lGlUi#
1658* 1668, and 1903 with China and the United States 
has grounds upon which to base objections, to the Japan­
ese demands’1 relative to Shantung, South Manchuria 
©nd East Mongolia, nevertheless, the united States 
frankly recognises thet territorial contiguity create^ 
special relations between Japan and these dls trices *3E
The negotiations between the two countries extended for three 
and one half months sod during this time, both China and the 
Western Powers were becoming increasingly critical of Japan.
The leaders of the Tokyo Government obtained approval from the 
Emperor to issue an ultimatum to Peking and on May 7th, the 
Chinese Government was notified that & categorical reply to the 
demands would he required before 6:00 p.m., on May 9th. The 
Chinese Government was now thoroughly alarmed and in return 
for future negotiations with Japan on the demands in Group 
the Chinese gave their consent to the other demands. The re­
vised agreements between the two nations were contained in 
the Sino-Japanese Treaties of May 2$, 19X5 which were to be
3^Foreign Halations of the United States, 1915 (Wash­
ing ton: United Stales GoveFnmenT TrlWfTng Offica, 1928), po•
105-111.
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ratified by the President of China and the Emperor of Japan# 
Under the Chinese Constitution, the treaties were also re­
quired to be ratified by Parliament and since this was not 
done, the Poking Government would later claim that the treaties
33were invalid*
Upon learning of the acceptance of the ultimatum by 
China, Secretary of State Bryan dispatched a note to China 
and Japan which said in part:
• • • The Government of the United States has the 
honor to notify the Imperial Japanese Government and 
the Government of China that it cannot recognize any 
agreement or undertaking which has been entered into 
or which may be- entered Into between the Governments 
of Japan and China, impairing the treaty rights of 
the United States and its citizens in China, the po­
litical or territorial integrity of the Republic of 
China, or the international policy relative to China 
commonly known as the open door policy.35-
In addition to facing domestic unrest and strained re­
lations with Japan, China was required to reconsider her rela­
tions vis a vis Germany* Following America’s break in diplo­
matic relations with Germany on February 3, 1917, President 
Wilson notified all the neutral countries that ha believed 
it would 11 make for the peace of the world if the other neutral
powers can find it passible to take siviiliar action to that
31' l la c h a ir  and Lach, 0£• ° l t * 9  P • 197* 
y
{?ore Igri Re la tions of the Un iteo States. 1915, P* 15-6,
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taken by this Government.11^  This statement, which was intend­
ed to be general in scope, was irarcedlately used by the Amer­
ican Minister at Peking, Mr* Paul S. Reinsch, as authority to 
urge China to sever relations with Berlin. Premier Tuan how­
ever, was not willing to enter the war except for a price•
The Chinese demanded that they be given a military loan of 
$10,000,00; allowed complete control over their forces and 
supplies; and that the united States fund its share of the 
Boxer Indemnity and urge the other Allied nations to do liko- 
wise."5 Reinsch was unable to communicate the terms to ''Wash­
ington immediately since the cable line was broken. Neverthe­
less, the American Minister went ahead and intimated that the 
'United States Government would approve China1s requests. When 
Washington learned of Reinsch*a action, the Minister was warn­
ed against giving any further unauthorised promises or assur­
ances since the Unite d States did not want to give the impres-
37sion that it was buying China*a support.
In the meantime, in exchange for her support of China*3 
entry into the war, Japan determined to obtain from the Allies 
a pledge to support her claims to Shantung and the German
■^Fore ign Ralat ions of trie United States, 1917* Supple - 
merit I ('Washington: United States Government Printing Office,
19llT) , p. 108.
36Ibld., pp. l4.Ol-l4.O2 .
_i.b jlcI ■, p • Lj~u U.
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islands in the North Pacific as Tokyo realized that her tem­
porary control over these German interests was subject to fi­
nal disposition at the Peace Conference* The first of a 
series of written confirmations wars received in February of 
191? when the British Ambassador, Conyngham Greene, handed 
the following message to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs;
With reference to the subject of our conversation 
of the 2'7th ultimo when Your Excellency informed me 
of the desire of the Imperial Government to receive 
an assurance that, on the occasion of a Peace Confer­
ence, His Britannic Msjest-y1 s Government will snpport 
the claims of Japan in regard to the disposal of Ger­
many 5 s rights in Shantung and possessions In the Is­
lands North of the Equator, I have the honor, under 
instructions received from His Britannic Majesty*s 
Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to 
communicate to Your .Excellency the following message 
from His Britannie Ma1e ~ ty*s Governmen 11
Els Majesty1s Government accedes with pleasure to 
the request of the Japanese Government for an assur­
ance that they will support Japan?s claims In regard 
to the 6.:. sposal of Germany ’ a rights in Shantung ana 
possessions in Islands North of Equator on tho occa­
sion of Peace Conference., it being understood that 
the Japanese Government will, in eventual peace 
settlement, treat In the s&ra® spirit Great Bri >qinf a 
claim to German Islands South of Equator** . ,*36
In a note dated March 1st, 1^X7, the French Government 
gave similiar assurance a to Japan and also asked that Japan 
wgive its support to obtain from. China the rupture of bar
38
"Wood, o£* cit* a p* 63*
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* 39diplomatic relations with Germany*” The British and Branch 
notes were followed by aim! liar assurances from Russia on 
March 5, 1917 and Italy on March 23, 19171°
The question of entry into the war became the occasion 
for a struggle for power between Premier Tuan and the Chinese 
Parliament, The Chinese people were largely pro-German and
there was no universal demand for entry into the war, The 
Kuomintaxig majority in Parliament was opposed to war since it 
would give Tuan an excuse to perpetuate himself in office.
On May 10th* the Tuan Government attempted to force a decla­
ration of war** however* the legislators would not give ground 
in face of threats and* as a result* all the cabinet members 
except Tuan and one colleague resigned. President LI there­
upon dismissed Tuan and dissolved Parliament, Three weeks 
later an. attempt was made to restore the young Manohu iSmperor 
to the throne but the war-lords, supported by trie former Pre­
mier* invaded Peking and restored Tuan to power* Whereupon* 
Tuan established a frankly pro-Jap&nese militarist government 
and promptly declared wax* against Germany on August 11*., 191?* 
It should be noted that China, made this declaration without
■^Wood* op , cit, * p, 69* 
k°Ibia., PP. 7ip-76.
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any definite promises of financial support or other conces-
41
sions from The Allies*
Tokyo was greatly disturbed by America1s entry into the 
war as the Japanese saspicioned that the United States intend­
ed to check Nippon*s growing power in China and the Pacific* 
Indeed, Lansing states that Japan could not understand Ameri­
ca *s altruistic purpose of f? fighting for liberty and democracy 
in Burc-pe *,!^  The Foreign Office also felt that the United 
States was unduly Influencing Chines© foreign policy and It 
was decided to send discount Ishil to tha United States In or­
der to f?exchange with responsible American officials frank 
views concerning problems In China and reach some form of un­
derstanding and settlement * At the same time* Washington 
hoped to preserve the peace and status ouo in the Pacific*
and thus, permit the United States to concentrate on the tfest~ 
hberr. iront» The IsJtiii Mission arrived In the United States 
on September 1, 1917, bub serious negotlationa were not begun 
until after the Viscount filled several speaking engagements 
in which ho defended the t; Japanese Monro© Doc trS ne?f for Asla*^
^Clyde, or, clt *, pp* 423-429
^Kobert Lansing, Lansing War Memoirs (Indianapolis: 
Babb-Merri 11 Co*, 19355, pp*-
--:ishi.i, op., cif * * p* 112, 
'^ "Gr.1 swold, op* c it*, p, 217* 
■> Eshli, op, cit*, p, 119.
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Ishii had Interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as Has assertion of 
primacy or paramount interest fcy the united States in its re­
lations to other American republics, • • •” and applied this 
principle to Japan*s position in China. Lansing, on the other 
hand, argued that this was an incorrect interpretation and 
that the Monroe Doctrine was actually Intended to prevent for­
eign encroachments and permit the individual self-dev@lop.ment 
46
of nations. The American Secretary of State proposed that 
the two nations formulate an * Open-Door* policy which would 
serve the purpose of alleviating tensions, particularly in 
China. The two diplomats gave much time to the phrasing of a 
statement which they intended to issue and when Mr. Lansing 
inquired as to the definition of Japan*a interests in China, 
Ishii replied that the term nparamount interests” was thought 
to be the correct expression. Lansing objected to this as it 
implied that other nations would be obligated to acquiesce to 
any action undertaken by Japan in Chine. After considerable 
discussion, the phrase nspecial interests” was substituted for 
wparamount Interests.” Notes Incorporating the Lansing-Ishii 
agreement were exchanged on November 2, 1917* The agreement 
was immediately subjected to misinterpretation on both sides
Foreign Relations of the United $tates» The Lansing 
Papers . (Wasiilngton: IjnTted States Government Printing Office,
19u0 f, il» ?• 436, (Hereafter cited as The Lansing, Papers ).
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and controversy developed when Japan interpreted the tern 
"special interests" in the sense of the Japanese equivalent 
word r1-ekl; this word can only be used in its literal inter­
pretation meaning advantage, prof it, or concrete interests. 
Lansing had only intended the term to be used in its economic 
and. non-political sense. The notes caused much dissatisfac­
tion in both the United States and China and the declaration
hiwas finally abrogated in 1923•
The Russian revolution of 191? resulted in the overthrow
of the Imperial Tsarist Government in favor of a liberal con­
stitutional monarchy. The Lvov-Xerensky regimes lasted only
eight months and were followed late in 1917 by the Bolsheviks
who promptly sued for peace with Germany.^ The French and
British were alarmed over the prospect of increased enemy
forces on the Western Front and the two nations proposed the
intervention of Japan to eliminate the threat of an enemy
U Q
penetration along the Slno-Siberlan border***" General Dimi­
tri L. liorvat, manager of the Chinese Eastern Railroad, at­
tempted to organize an anti-Bolshevik .force and obtained the 
support of a Cossack, Captain Gregory Semenov. The Horv&t-
\; *7
^ ' Jeremiah W. Jenks, "Japan in Action," North American 
Review, OCX (Sept., 1919), p. 319; Griswold, op'7 eft.7 pp, 
"SXBy'Tshii, oo. olt., pp. 127-133,
^George Vernadsky, A History of Russia (New Havens 
Yale Hnivers I fcy Press , 19$ii7,~pp. 23i$-k9b»
k9curry, op. cit. , p. 211;..
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Semenov forces obtained the support of the British, French 
and Japanese Governments and operated along the Trans-Siber­
ian Railroad area where they 6 Istlnguished the rase Ives larg el./
30
by the ir* brutal i ty •
The British Jar Cabinet was concerned over the possibil­
ity t hat 61|J3,000 tons of military supplies In Siberia would 
fall into the hands of the Reds and Sir Robert Cecil of the 
British Foreign Office formally proposed the military inter­
vention of Japan in Siberia* Washington immediately rejected 
this proposal and Ambassador Roland Morris advised the Por- 
eign Office that such Intervention would only serve to aid 
German propaganda.. President Wilson was quite upsot over the 
proposal and wrote that he did not know "whan he had ever had
a more tiresome struggle with quicksand than in trying to do
bltha right thing in respect with our dealings with Russia*
In an effort to out-m&nouver Wilson, the British brought 
the ir proposal before tha Supreme War Council In Paris. Since 
the decisions of the Council required unanimity, the American 
Delegate, General Tasker Bliss, referred the question back to 
Washington. The United States made cle ar its stand on Japan­
ese intervention In the following message:
WQ^ Curry, oo. cit., p. 21>. 
si
Curry, op. clt., citing Wilson Papers, I I ,  p. 133 > V I ,
p • 6iq.
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It has no objection to the request being made* and 
It wishes to assure the Japanese Government that It 
has entire confidence that in putting an armed force 
Into Siberia It is doing so as an ally of Russia, with 
no purpose but to save Siberia from tha invasi on of 
the armies and the intrigues of Germany and with entire 
willingness to leave the determination of all questions 
that may affect the permanent fortun©a of Siberia to 
the- Council of Peace *2*-
After some misgivings on giving Japan tacit approval
to intervention, the original message was withdrawn and In a
subsequent message, Wilson declared that it would be unwise
to Intervene as it would play into the hands of both Germany
cf i
and the enemies of the revolution. However, Great Britain 
was not undaunted in her efforts and again proposal Interven­
tion to Wilson* In the meantime, rumors circulated that
SO,000 German and American prisoners were occupying Irkutsk 
and this event, together with the opening of the German 
spring offensive, favored the hopes of the interventionists* 
Following Allied reverses in the war and repeated pleas from 
the British, Wilson authorized discussions between Lansing 
and IshiI on the subject* The Japanese had already landed 
troops in Vladivostok following the murder of a few Japanese 
and the precedent for Intervention was already established* 
Further support was gained when Wills on learned that some
<Z '^ fne Lan«l n& Papers „ El, p.
"'-'Curry, op* clt*, p* 223,
JO,000 Czooh forces were bottled up at Irkutsk and that they 
desired to raake their way to Vladivostok and eventually back 
to Fra no e by you In order to continue fighting Germany, V/ II- 
aon now reluctantly agreed to Intervention and raade his deci-
Si j,
si on known to his staff.
The United States proposed that e&oh of the two nations 
furnish J,000 -nan for the purpose of guarding the linos of 
connunlcatton in Siberia and that Japan was to immediately dis­
patch troops while those from the United States would follow 
later# The Japanese Government delayed In answering the pro­
posal and the Acting Secretary of state, Frank L* Polk, thought 
that this delay was prompted by the question of command over 
the joint expedition and, with Wilson1a consent, the Japan- 
cso were advises that they could have the senior position#^"* 
Tokyo replied on July 2!yth that It could not set a limit on 
the number of troops since this would show lack of confidence 
on the part of the United States In Nippon13 motives, Ishii, 
however, indicated that the Japanese intended to send 12,000
troops end Polk replied that Washington would not object to
o/
trio dispatch of a Division#^
Peyton 0. March, "Japanese Strategy in the Par East."
Yale Review, XXIII (Sept. 1933), p. 3!+.
ob
^ X b i d ,, p* 23k*
■•'r'
^Curry, op# cit., pp* 231-232#
The American contingent of 9*000 troops was placed 
under the command of Major General Milllam S* Graves• The 
Japanese claimed that the United States * by exceeding the
7,000 figure, abrogated the original agreement and rapidly in­
creased their forces from about 10,000 to 60,000 men and ex­
tended their control along the Trans-SIberian and Chinese 
Eastern Railroads. The railroads were later placed under the 
control of a technical board with an American, Mr. John P.
Stevens, in charge but were actually operated by the Russian
67Railway Service Corps.
Most of the nations participating in the intervention 
relied upon Whit© Russian groups for aid. Trie Japanese re­
lied mainly on the Cossacks, the worst of whom was Semenov. 
The Cossack leader was merciless in dealing with his enemies! 
he delighted in sending out indiscriminate raiding parties, 
robbing banks and pilfering freight shipments. It has been 
argued that the Japanese supported the Semenov faction in 
order to keep Siberia in a state of unrest which would re­
quire their presence to maintain order. The Japanese later 
sought to establish Semenov as the puppet leader of a Pan- 
Mongol movement which would unite the Mongolian people under 
Nippon. The movement failed due to lack of financial support
67 
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and the Inability to organize the various national groups#
In 1918, China and Japan entered into a series of a- 
greements which later proved damaging to China at the Paris 
Peace Conference* Notes were signed between the Chinese Min­
ister In Tokyo, Tsung-Hsiang Chang, and Baron Shimpel Goto, 
the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs# Wood claims that 
the Minister exceeded his authority in negotiating with the
Japanese and that the agreements were illegal since they were
59
not ratified by the Chinese Government. There is no doubt 
however, that the government authorities were well aware of 
the discussions and it is apparent that money considerations 
out-weighed other factors. The first two agreements related 
to the construction of the two railroads in Shantung between 
Tsinan aid Shunteh and Kaomi and Hsu-chow. The Chinese Gov­
ernment agreed to borrow the necessary capital in Tokyo to 
finance the construction of these railroads and agreed, If the 
Japanese considered them inadequate from a standpoint of op­
erations, to allow them to construct slmiliar facilities in 
other areas in Shantung. Meanwhile, the Chines© pledged the 
railways as security for the construction loans, estimated at
70,000,000 yen. At the same time, the two countries entered
58John Albert White, The Siberian Intervention (Prince­
ton: Princeton University Press, 19^0J, pp. 193-265.
59 _^ Wood, op. clt., p. 98.
into similiar arrangements for the construction of four other 
rail systems: between Changchun and Taonan; Kai-yuan, Hai-
lung and Kirin; Taonan and Dalny; Taonan and Jehol to a sea­
port, the exact location of which was to be determined at a 
later date. All of these lines were located in Manchuria and
Mongolia and wez^ e considered of strategic importance to the
60Japanese, In addition, Tokyo also agreed to pay Peking
20,000,000 for the purpose of underwriting a "War Participa­
tion Loan1’ which would be used for the purpose of organizing
a defensive array and to pay expenses of participating in the 
61war. ' Actually, this money was needed by Premier Tuan to
hold out against dissident elements in the south and had lit-
62tie bearing upon China1 s war efforts, which were negligible. 
Perhaps the most damaging of all the provisions was the agree­
ment that provided for the withdrawal of Japanese troops from 
Kiaochow and the connecting railroad to Tsinan in return for a 
Chinese agreement that the line would become a joint enterprise. 
Japanese personnel were to be employed at the Headquarters and 
training school of the Chinese police force as well as at the 
principal railway stations. This latter agreement served to
^°MaoMurray, op. clt., II, pp. li4.lfS-li1.5 2 .
^Willoughby, o£. cit., pp. 395-396.
^2Wood, op. cit., p. 96.
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bolster Tokyo*s claims for concessions in the province when
63the Peace Conference met in Paris*
By the time the Armistice was declared in November of 
1913* the Japanese completely dominated Eastern Siberia* Sec­
retary Lansing protested this by stating, nThe United States 
has viewed with surprise the presence of the large number of 
Japanese troops now in north Manchuria and eastern Siberia. 
. . .  Such monopoly is certainly opposed not only to the pur­
pose of this Government to assist Russia but also to its 
views regarding C h i n a . F o l l o w i n g  this protest, the Japan­
ese managed to remove about 50,000 troops from the areas
specified by the Secretary. Nevertheless, they did not relin-
6iiquish their control over Siberia until 1922.^
Japan had now gained most of her announced objectives* 
Through her alliance with Great Britain she played a limited 
role in the Great War yet reaped benefits in excess of what 
was justified by her wartime efforts* From a weak Chinese 
Government whom ah© had openly bribed with money and threats, 
Tokyo obtained legal recognition of its foothold in China.
By means of secret agreements with the European Powers, she 
gained, prior to the Peace Conference, support for her claims
63
Wood, o£. ci t *, p. 314* 
^ ‘H'/hite, op* cl t*, p* 210.
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to the German Islands north of the equator and on the Shantung 
peninsula. By participation in the Siberian intervention, she 
extended her influence and control throughout Eastern Siberia 
and even dreamed of a puppet state in Mongolia which would be 
dependent upon Japan.
CHAPTER V
W E  PATUR PEACE CONFERENCE
Japan entered the .Peace Conference negotiations with 
the status of a Greet Power. This standing was granted only 
after some misgivings on the part of the leader of the French 
Delegation, M. Georges Clemenceau, who declared:
W© have agreed that Japan should have five delegates 
like the Great Powers. Japan participated in the war 
in the Far East, but who can that in the war she
played a part that can be compared for instance to that 
of France? Japan defer dad It# interests In fh© Far 
last but when she was requested to intervene in Europe, 
©vovyon© knew what the answer was. ...**•
In a plan submitted to Colonel House by the French 
Foreign Office and Tatar incorporated into the Jcsstrsnd not© 
of November 29, X?18, addressed to th© ?lnit©d States Govern­
ment, Japan was not 3.1stad as one of the Great Powers that 
would discuss the preliminary organisation of th© Peace Con­
ference. However, in a meeting held on December 2 and 3.* 
1918, the Premiers of Franc®, Great Britain, and Italy had 
agreed that the Tokyo Government should be included as on© of 
the Greet Powers to w e t  at an Inter-Allied Conf crane© At
Poreig.n Halations of thn United States-The Paris Peace 
Conference» 1919 TWaahington: Inited States Government Print­
ing Office, 3943)» III, p. 506. {Hereafter cited as Paris 
Peace Conference).
2
Paims Peace Conference, I, pp. 3U1, 3t>5-371 •
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the first session, the Japanese were advised by M. Clemeneeau, 
the President of the Conference, that they would be granted 
the right to attend all sessions and commissions. While the 
Tokyo delegation was obviously pleased with this recognition, 
Viscount Ishli commented that his government’s position was 
not due t o "any good-will or patronage on the part of the oth­
er powers," but to the "united efforts of her officials and 
peoples under the leadership of the emperors Hoiji and Taisho* 
and "her participation in the London Declaration."^
After the Conference became organized, tho Supreme War 
Council was replaced by the Council of Ten, with two represen­
tatives each from the United States, Great Britain, France, 
Italy and Japan. This council met from the opening of the ses­
sions in January until late in March when the workload was 
shif ted, first, to the five Foreign Ministers Council of 
Five, and then to the Premiers who were designated as
the Council of Four. The Nipp on delegation was not entirely 
happy with this latter arrangement. It was explained to them 
that since their Premier was not in attendance at Par*! 3, they 
would be excluded from the deliberations of this group. How­
ever, President Wilson instructed Colonel House to assure 
Baron Makino that the Japanese would be given an opportunity
^Ishii, op. ci t., p. 103.
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to participate in world matters not concerning purely Europe-
kan affairs.
The Hippon delegation consisted of the following five
members: Marquis Salonji Kiramochi, former Premier, the second
President of the Selyukai Party, and genro or elder statesman;
Viscount Chinda Suterai, Ambassador to Great Britain; Mr. Mat-
sui Keishiro, Ambassador to France; Mr. Ijuin Kanetomo, Am-
bassiidor to Italy. The delegation was carefully selected by
the Hara. Government* Prince Salonji was a distinguished
statesman and nobleman who had previously met Clemeneeau while
a student in Francs about 1870. Baron Makino was appointed
a plenipotentiary at the specific request of Marquis Salonji
and the Baron, together with Viscount Chinda, participated in
the sessions while trie aged leader mainly stayed In his suit©
6at the Hotel Bristol. Th© other three members were drawn 
from the important diplomatic posts of London, Paris and Home.
It was readily apparent at the peace Conference that 
the Japanese delegation members were mainly interested in 
matters affecting their own country and were little concerned
^"Russell H. Fifield, Hood row Wilson and the Far has t 
(New York: Thome.s Y. Crowell Go., l^TS'JT^pT~TlTgT~
^Yanaga, op. c11., p. 3^8; Takeuchi, op. cit., pp. 220-
A°Takeuohi, op. c1fc., p. 221.
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over the affairs of Europe• 1 The delegation received its in­
structions from the Gaiko Chosaks.i or Advisory Council on 
Foreign Relations and had but little leeway in making indepen-
Q
dent decisions on policy matters.' The Nippon diplomatic rep­
resentatives can}.© to Paris with the determination, that Japan 
would not be reduced to the status of a second or third class 
power and with the specific objectives of obtaining the ces­
sion of the German rights In Shantung; permanent control over 
the German Islands north of the Equator; a declaration of ra­
cial equality as a. basic principle of the League of Nations.^ 
The Chine se delegation, which was destined to become 
the main foe of the neighboring Nippon, consisted of an e~ 
qually distinguished group who wore undoubtedly better able
to communicate and play upon the sympathy of the other na- 
10
tions: Lou Tseng-slang, Minister of Foreign Affairs and
head of the delegation; Cheng-ting Thomas Wang, former Minis­
ter of Agriculture and Commerce; VI Kyuin Wellington Koo, Min­
ister at Washington; Sao-Ke Alfred 3ze, Minister at London; 
Suntchou Wei, Minister at Brussels. The Peking group hoped
?Yanaga, op. cit., p. 363.
8'Takeuebl, op. ci t., p. 221; Ishii, op. clt., p. xii.
9Boyama Masamichi, Foreign Policy of Japan (Tokyo: 
Japanese Council, Ins ti tute of Pad f i c Relati ons , 19l|A), p. 28,
10Treat, Japan and the United States, p. 231.
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to obtain the cancellation of the Boxer Indemnity; the return 
of Shantung; the abolishment of extraterritoriality and other 
special rights held by foreign nations in China; the recogni­
tion of the right of China to fix her own tariff rates and the 
abrogation of demands conceded to Japan by the Treaties of 1915 
and 1913*-^
Fresident Wilson hoped that the subject of the League
of Nations would be given the first priority followed by the
subjects of (2) Reparation; (3) New States; (I*.) Frontiers
12and territorial changes; (5) Colonies. Lloyd George# at a 
meeting of the Council of Ten held on January 23, 1919# op­
posed this agenda on the grounds that wOriental questions and 
Colonial questions were less invoiced,” and could be disposed 
of more quickly. Wilson replied that ”the worldTs unrest a- 
roee from the unsettled condition of Europe, not from the 
state of affairs In the East or in the Colonies. . . The
President however, did not insist upon his agenda and the sub­
ject of the disposition of the colonies came up for discussion 
11
the next day .
The Nippon case for the retention of the former German 
islands came up for discussion at a meeting of the Council
^Steiger* op. ci t., p. 769*
12Paris Peace Conference# III, p. 700.
1h b i d ., pp. 713-719.
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on January 2?th# Pour alternatives were open to the Council 
concerning the former German colonies: (1) outright annexa­
tion; (2) restoration to Germany; (3) 1n to r ns. tlonallza-
Ik
tlon; (4 } placement under a mandate# Ths Tokyo- delegation
already knew that Australia, Hew Zealand and trie Union of 
fouth Africa strongly favored annexation, while Groat Britain 
preferred m mandate system* Britain, France and Italy ware 
already committed to support Illppon*s claim and It was almost 
pro-doter mined that Japan would retain control over the colo-
i c*
dies by one of the above means# President Wilson opened the
discussion by suggesting that the appropriate delegations be
'beard prior to making any piecemeal disposition of the Pacific
colonies* In the procedural discussion that followed, it was
agreed that the Dominion delegates should participate in the
Ifipponese presentation concerning the colonies while China
would attend the dissuasions ooncerninc SUoehoM.3,6
Baron Kakiiao opened his ease by declaring;
The Japanese Government feels Justified in claiming 
from the German Government the unconditional cession 
of: (a) The leased territory of Kiaoohow together
with the railways, and other rights possessed by Ger­
many In respect of the Gh&ntung drovince# (b) All of 
the Islands in German possession In the Pacific Ocean
^Paris Peace Confer®moo» III, pp* 713-719*
^George H# Blakeslee, nThe Mandates of the P&olflCf **
foreign Affairs* I (fept., 1922), pr>. 99-100. ?lfield, op.
c T t T T p . T ^ :
^Paris Peace Qonferenoa, 111, p, 737*
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north of the Equator together with the rights and 
properties In connection therewith*
The Japanese forces have, in conjunction with 
the Briti sh contingents, succeeded h  taking the 
leased territory aa well as the railway line con­
necting Tslngtau with Chlnanfu* which the Germans 
used for military purposes* Japan, has continued 
in possession of the rights enjoyed by Germany.
The clrcurnstances demanded that the German South 
Sea Islands should forthwith be taken possession of 
In order to defeat the enemy*a object, and the Ger­
man possessions north of the Equator have since re­
mained under Japanese occupation and control* • « .
Japan being in actual possession and having regard 
to the circumstances which led to such occupation 
and to the present conditions above alluded to, and 
further, in view of the public opinion of Japan which 
is unanimous In this connection, she claims the def­
inite possession of these Islands where she may con­
tinue to protect the Inhabitants and to endeavor to 
better their conditions.
In conclusion, it may be stated that, In view of 
the extent of their efforts and achievement® In des­
troying German, bases in the Extreme Orient and the 
South and in safeguarding the Important routes
on the Pacific and Indian Oceans and the Mediterran­
ean waters to say nothing of their contribution In 
other respect®, the Japanese Government feel® confi­
dent that the claims above advanced would be regarded 
a® only just and fair. *
Upon conclusion of the speech, Doctor Hang of the Chi­
nese delegation asked, the Council to reserve decision until
18C M n a  also had the opportunity to b© heard.
The meeting of the Council on January 28th brought to 
light the existence of the secret treaties between China and
^ Paris Peace Conference. Ill, pp. 738-740. 
l8I M d .. p. 754.
?3
Japan and the ensuing discussions over these treaties had
ramifications all the way back to Tokyo and Peking* This
meeting also marked the only time when both of the Oriental
19
countries argued face-to-face before the council* Lloyd 
George opened the session by stating that Britain was willing 
to follow the mandate system insofar as territory conquered 
by her was concerned* Clemence&u then followed by stating 
that fee thought that any contentions concluded by the parties 
to the hearing should be brought before tbs Council and asked 
whether Japan would agree to this action* Baron Mskino re­
plied that "he had no objection in doing bo/ and would send 
all such agreements to fee Chairman* Ms kino was only refer­
ring to the secret agreements of 1917 reached with the Euro­
pean Powers. The Council went on to discuss the Kiaochow 
Issue and Clemenceau asked fee Oriental delegates if they 
were prepared to .lay before the Council any agreements or en­
gagements undertaken between the two nations. Makino, some­
what taken aback at this request stated that he must first
ao
obtain permission from his home government* He then want on 
to say, "Japan was in actual possession of the territory,*1 
pdaochow], and "before disposing of it to a third party it 
was necessary that Japan should obtain the right of free dis~
^ Paris reace Conference» III, p* 754*
zoi M a „  pp. 75^-755.
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poaal from Germany.?l
Doctop Hoc then followed wi th a brilliant presentation 
of China1s case. The delegate cited the fact that he was 
spokesman for over i|X)0 millions or one quarter of th® human 
race# He flatly asked the Council for tfaa restoration to Chi­
na of the Leased Territory, th# railway in Shantung and all 
other rights Germany possessed before the war. Koo then went 
on to cite the diplomatic history concerned with the leasehold 
and that while Chins appreciated Japanfs efforts during the
war, China now asked for direct restitution to the Peking Gov-
2*1
ernment of all of Germany*s rights in Shantung* ~
The meeting on January 27 th was but a forerunner of
further difficulties for the Nipponese delegation and Makino
and the other members realised that they would have to face
th© hostility of not only China but also the United States*
Lou Tseng-tslang had stopped off at Tokyo on th© way to th©
Peace Conference and had a talk with Foreign Minister TJchida.
Tlx© Japanese were lad to believe that China would cooperate
with them at Paris and thus were quite surprised to note Tseng-
tsiangfs absence with Ko© acting as spokesman for th® delega- 
22
tion« China, on the other hand, feared a reprisal for as­
senting to produce th® texts of the secret agreements* This
21Paris Peace Conference, III, pp. 755-756.
22Plfi eld, ££♦ cd t*, p. l!*0.
Bo
real” was not without foundation for on February 2# 1919# Min­
ister Ohata foriklchi called upon Mr* Chen-Lu, Chinese Acting 
Minister of Foreign Affaire, and expressed the Tokyo Govern­
ment 1a displeasure at the trend of events at Paris* Obata
reminded chen~»Lu of the strength of the Japanese Array and Ha-
23
vy and of China's heavy indebtedness to her neighbor* The
American Ambassador# Mr* Paul Belnsch# was instructed by
President Wilson to advise the Chinese Government to sfstand
2ii
firm5 and not give in to the Nipponese# Nevertheless# the 
Chineso Cabinet at first decided not to publish the secret 
agreements but upon President Hsu Shih-ch’ang** insistence# 
the texts of the agreements were eventually published# ^
The racial ©quality issue cam® up for discussion dur­
ing the month of February# The basic Instruction to the 
Tokyo delegation reads
The imperial Japanese Government considers the League
of Nations the moat Important organisation of peace and 
agrees to its purpose* However, the racial discrimina­
tion still prevailing in international relations would 
endanger the very purpose for which the League of Ma­
il ons was constituted# This situation may bring consid­
erable disadvantage to our nation* * • .You are instructed 
to exert your utmost effort in order to obtain as far as 
possible the necessary guarantee against any possible
23Pifi®ld, 0£, clt., p. 145.
21* Griswold, 0£, clt., p. 245.
2^PJ.field, C£. clt., p. 154.
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<31 sadvanteg© that may he caused by this racial 
prejudice*S6
Baron Ms kino sad viscount Chirclc, decided to seek out 
Color*eI hour?# and ask him for assistance in preparing the 
racial equality resolution.* The Colonel recommended that 
they nropa.ro two proposalsj one which they desired, and one 
which tlioy would ha wiXXir.g to accept in lieu of thalr first 
proposala douse later showed ^resident Vi Ison the two 
drafts* ?he first proposal, war Immediately discarded as too 
radical. # The President used a some changes in the second pro­
posal and tha draft m s  handed back to Chindm#^ The Japan- 
#®o ccnoidared thle latter revision too watered-down mad 
meaningless and prepared their own version which was submit­
ted to the Censnlseion on the league of Hattons on February 
?th in the following form?
The equality of nations being a basic principle 
of the league of nation#, the High, Contracting Bar tie a 
agree to accord# as soon aa possible, to all alien 
national# of State# members of the League equal and 
Just treatment in every respect, making no distinction, 
either in law or in fact, on account of their race or 
miiomlltjv-^
The resolution was vigorously opposed by Lord Robert Cecil 
at a meeting of the Plenary Session held on February 13th and
^Fifield# op* pit*. p# 153# citing letter to author 
from Japanese correspon3eht, March 15# 1951#
^Charles Seymour# (ed*} yha Intimate gapers qf Colonel 
H o u m  (Boston? Houghton# Kifflin'an<T WoV$ X 9S8 }# ' pp« 3W-5TS7
2®Dmvia Hunter Hiller# The Drafting of the Covenant 
(New iorkt Doubleday, Page «i3nfo7; I922t,"T17T. ----
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the matter was temporarily dropped. However, a few weeks 
later, President V/ilaon was handed a message by the Japanese 
delegatee making for further aasi stance in drafting a racial 
equality clause stating that "any suggestions from the Presi­
dent will be entertained wi £h groat pleasure ,”^9 Following 
the President* a return fron Paris on March 14th, the Nippon­
ese decided to deal directly with their opponents and visited 
Premier Hughes of .Australia and advised him that their pro­
posal 11 seeks only the recognition of the principle but does
„  10
not request immediately any concrete measures# The dele­
gates were unsuccessful in swaying the Australian loader and
a week later, they visited Colonel Mouse and showed him a new
proposal which reads
Am a principle of the league of Nations, the High 
Contracting Hartley agree to endorse the principle of 
equal and just treatment to be accorded to^all alien
nationals of states members of the League#-*
(The collection of the House Papers by Seymour makes no refer­
ence to this proposal)# Prime Hinlster Hughes would not agree 
to any form of racial equality provisions being adopted and 
when a revised proposal was brought before the Dominion Prime 
Ministers, Hughes stomped out of the room declaring, fIt Is
pa
•Ray Stann&rd Baker# Woodrow Wilson and World Settle­
ment (Hew forks Doubleday, A & T S O T  5 5 7 7 1 9 ^ , T T r T p T ^ ^
^Fifield, op, clt#, p* 163, citing letter to author 
from Japanese correspondent, March 15, 1951#
3^Xbid*, p, 163*
not a question of wording or phraseology* Australia repudi­
ates the whole Idea behind this proposition. You are free 
to act on your own* I shall maintain my stand*1 In spite 
of such opposition, the Tokyo delegates decided to submit a 
proposal to the League of Hafelons Commission on April 11th, 
asking that the preamble of the Covenant be amended’ to include 
the clause, f!by the endorsement of the principle of the ©~ 
quality of HatIona and the just tree femenfe of their nationals” 
without making any specific mention of the controversial term 
r’race*,f Lord Cecil replied to the flipponese proposal that It 
would be encroaching upon the sovereignty of the members of 
the League and that he would vote against the measure * Vis­
count Chlnda strongly retorted that the Japanese people were 
behind the proposal and that if It was rejected, it would b©
an indication that equality of members was not recognised by 
33the League.
President Wilson was placed in a delicate situation 
since he was presiding at the vote of the Commission* While 
eleven members present, representing Japan, France, Italy, 
Brazil, Greece, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and China voted 
for the measure, Wilson ruled that unanimity was required
Bk
and the proposal was defeated.3^ The Japanese nation was
greatly distressed over this defeat and President Wilson 
shared the major portion of the blame with the Osaka Main!chi 
declaring that ”be had a female demon within him.?!35
Tii© Nipponese delegation was now firmly determined not 
to yield on the Shantung issue. Their Instructions from the 
Gaiko Chosakai read:
In compliance with the terms of the official doc a* 
ments exchanged In connection with the Japanese-Chi­
nese agreement of 'May 2 ?, 191?, in the matter of the 
province ol Shantung, our Impire has the ualinite in­
tention of returning the Fiaochow Bay settlement to 
China after we acquire the unconditional cession of 
said settlement in the treaty with Germany. Naturally 
there will be no objections to the indication of this 
decision by our peace envoys at any proper opportunlty. 
However, our government cannot agree to make retroces­
sion a condition for the assignment of the said settle­
ment from Germany to Japan. It must be clearly under­
stood that this matter shqpld be settled absolutely 
by Japan and China aiono.^°
The Shantung Isaac was presented to the Council of Four 
at the meeting hold on April 3th, when the Council reviewed 
a list of subjects awaiting consideration, the last of which 
read; ?TJapanese questions as regards Kiaochou sic and Shan-
* 5 7
tung.-*1 While waiting for their appearance before the Council
-^Miller, op. d  t., I, pp. J4.6l-I1.66.
3-^PIfield, op. cl t., p. 169, citing Osaka Main!chi.
3^Russell H. Fifield, nJapanese Policy toward the Shan­
tung Quo 31 x on at the Paris Peace Conference, The Journal of 
Modern History XXIII (Sept. 1951), p* 267*
3^Paria Feace Conference, V, p. 65•
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the Nipponese delegation occupied themselves with pourparlers 
in an effort to strengthen fcboir eaao, The Advisorj Council 
on Foreign Relations dispatched the following additional In­
structions to Marquis Salonji*
Regarding your telegram Eo* Ho* 620, the policy 
of our empire In regard to loo negotiations relative 
to Tsingtau is, as stated In our telegram Ko. No*
126, to acquire the -same uaeonditionally from Germany 
and to return the same to China according to the terms 
of the Japanese-Chinaas agreement* fill a is the final 
decision, of our government and no change Is perm! a sable* 
Therefore in case our proposal la not approved or tlm 
mandatory principle under the League of Nations Is 
applied to our terms on Tsingtau, do not sign the Cove­
nant of the League of Rations and advise us to that 
effect* If you have made certain committments against 
the above mentioned policy, there will bo no room for 
ad justment, Therefora, do your utmoat undor tha cir- 
curns lanen s * 0
At the afternoon session of the Council of Four, held 
on Apr! 1 21st, Wilson reported the substsmeo of a conversa­
tion that morning with i'-iaklno and CMnda, The President sug­
gested that all claims in the Pacific * should be ceded to the 
Allied and Associated rowers aa trustees leaving them to make 
fair and just dispositions** The Japanese ware reminded that 
they already received a mandate for the German islands north 
of the Equator* The dalegates retorted that they were nset 
on obliging China to carry out the bond,* and that the Powers
3®F1 field, 11 Japanese Policy toward the Shantung QueS' 
tion at the Paris Peace Conference,* pp* 267-268,
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ahould ”trus t Japan, to carry out hep bargain with China
The following day, the Council met at President Wil­
son* a house with Baron Hakino as the first speaker at the se@* 
si on# Makiao gave a long and detailed resrnie of the Kl.aoeh.ow 
1# asobol C3 r"3 ti j * win.s t the lease was abrogated, ipso facto,
by Chine*s declareti on cf war. Upon conclusion of his speech, 
Mr# George retorted that the other nations suah as Australia 
might make a almillar claim for the surrender of German terri­
tory and that therj was hardly time to settle all such matter* 
before signing the treaty wi th Germany, Viscount Chinda fore­
saw the possibility of delaying tactics and informed the Coun­
cil that If th© Shantung demands were not met, the Japanese 
delegation would not sign the treaty# After detailed ques­
tioning by President Wilson over the Japan#©# operation of th# 
leasehold, Chinda and Makino agreed to the President*a inten­
tion of hearing the Chinese ease on th# following afternoon#^ 
The session, with th# Chines# commenced by th# President 
reviewing the entire garnet of bino-Japanese relations during 
the war years, noting specifically the secret agreements of 
1915 end 1918# Wilson informed th# Peking delegation that he 
was unable to gain the acceptance of the Japanese for a five- 
Power trusteeship over Klaoehow nor the renunciation of the
39paria Peace Conference, V, pp# 109-110# 
^°Xbld.. pp. 123-133.
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claims of the Tokyo delegates* Th© rresldeat went on to
©tat© that while there wei s w  doubt in his mind ova? ta©
validity of th© wartime its between China and Japan,
wthar© w$ab no doubt whatsoever* as to the agreements entered
into by France and Great Britain# Mr# Hog wee reminded that
all unjust treatment of China ntmo not by any means bean
confined to Japan.,*1 and that it ^ould not do to Identify jus
it 1tlo& with the unfortunate ©ng©g©:ment3 of thm paat*^
Marquis Salonjt* although not taking a direct part In 
the negotiations, wmm becoming impatient over the dalaya in 
settling fciie contraveray and dispatched trie following not® t 
Olcmenceau:
Mr* President: The Chiefs of the Government of th©
Great Powera having already heard th# Delegate# of 
China on the subject of the question of th© Province 
of bhantu&g, I wish to express in the name of the 
Jape tie# © Delegation, the desire to see as soon as 
peesIbl© a further meeting to expedite tha definitive 
settlement of fchia question*
Considering the peculiar Importance of tula qua a* 
tlon for Japan, I would be grateful, Hr* President, 
if you would keep ua, so far as possible, informed of 
all steps in Ifca*furtherance*
Ace opt etc* 1*2
f m  Ohin©## decided to submit a four~point proposal 
which would be compatible with their national interests and 
which read:
%, <1
i r " P a r i s  P e a c e  C o n f e r e n c e ,  V ,  d * L uc*M4hHWM*-U.lA«* maWMi^ — ni—Wm ***** .UM lii! Iff,. im+tmi* ,.*# *«* ^  * ?
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X# Germany renounces to th® Five Allied and Associa­
ted Powers her holdings, rights and privileges in Shan­
tung. for restoration to China*
IX* Japan, being in possession of the said holdings, 
rights and privileges, engage® to effect the said res­
toration to Chine within one year after the signature 
of the freaty of Feme® with Germany#
III* China agrees to make a pecuniary compensation 
to Japan for the military expenses incurred in the 
capture of fsingtao, the amount of the said compensa­
tion to be determined by the Council of Four#
IV# China agrees to open the whole of Kiaochow Bay 
as «* commercial Fort, and to provide a special quarter,
If desired, for the residence of the cltisens and sub­
jects of the treaty powers*43
At th# Council meeting held at the President1® residence 
at 6s30 P*M* , on April 25th, th© three Council members review­
ed Marquis Salonji*# letter, a report of the committee study­
ing the Shantung problem and the statement of the Chinee# 
which Incorporated th© four-point proposal* After reviewing 
the documents, it was suggested by Mr* George that someone 
should be appointed to sound out the Japanese before they 
appeared before th® Supreme Council* At President Wilson*s 
suggestion, both Mr* -George and Mr* Balfour were asked to 
visit Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda, however, Mr* Georg® 
assigned the task to his Foreign Minister* Later the same 
evening, Wilson discussed the Shantung issue with Mr* Baker 
and commented that ?fthey are not bluffers, and they will go
^ Paris Peace Conference,* V, p* 250*
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horn© unless w© give them what they should not have/f^
The Amortcan Chief Executive was deeply disturbed over 
the failure to resolve the Shantung problem and on the after* 
noon of April 26th* th© President and the four Commissioners 
met together to consider the matter* Three of the Coramis- 
sioners* Lansing* White and Bliss* favored holding out a* 
gainst the Nipponese demands while Colonel Hone# felt that
such a stand might lead to a Japanese wlthdraw&l from the
|}C
Conference* Mr* Lansing was asked if h® would visit th# 
Japanese delegation in an effort to dissuade them, from their 
demands* Lansing was personally unpopular with th© Nipponese 
and th® meeting was not only unsuccessful but quite stormy*
The delegation* in a report to Tokyo* stated that Lansing in­
timated that the Japanese might prolong th© retrocession of 
Xlaoohoftr or make unreasonable demand-s for compensation* Lan­
sing* according to the Japanese report* went on to say that 
11 an agreement made under certain overpowering conditions can­
not necessarily be recognised as valid,**46 The American Sec­
retary of State in recalling this visit states that Viscount 
Chinda made it clear that M s  country intended to insist upon
^•Bakar, ££. clt.. IX, p. 253,
Kg
^Seymour* op* cit*» p* 451*
|i £>
Fifield, "Japanese Policy toward th© Shantung Question 
at th© Paris Peace Conference/* pp* 270-272*
90
U 7
hcr^pound of flesh*1 and the meeting was an. utter failure •'*
Balfour was somewhat more successful in M b  m ee tin g  
w ith  Baron Maklno, and was ab le  to 'raft a fo rm u la  for the 
return of Shantung to the Chines®# Balfour sumxariaeu M s  
report of the visit by stating:
In the first p la c e , the Japanese strenuously deny 
either that they intend to modify in their own favor 
the conditions which the Germans had imposed upon 
the Chinese in connection with the Shantung Penlnsu- 
la, or that, la f a c t ,  their treaties with China would 
havo bad that effect#
They say, on the contrary, that they propose sur­
rendering all military control over the Peninsula, in­
cluding the 50~kiXomatra son© around Kimochow within 
which German troops wars allowed but not Chinese, and 
all interference with the civil admi n 1 s trs. ti on of the 
territory* Their intention is fully to restore Chip- 
izese sovereignty within the leased territory,, * .
Wilson express©d n m m  doubt over the exact m eaning of 
the Japanese p ro p o sa l and added t h a t  "if th© Japanese would 
concede a l l  m i l i t a r y  r ig h t s  and xm ke  their agreem ent a pure*#
 ^& O
ly economic one, he would agree to what they desired**?^ / 
E-aifour was an thori&ed to eoimourilcat© with the Tokyo delega­
tion and in a very conciliatory letter, he commented:
, • * ih© only points on which your colleagues ex- 
pressed anxiety were the temporary arran.geman.ts wi th
Robert Lansing, The Peace gapptiatlons (Boston: 
Houghton Mifflin, and Co# T92177” p#*~^ 5i5T""’
^ JBakor, op* clt*, III, p* 311*
1. fy
'+v Paris Peace Corxf eronoo, V , n» 313*
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regard to guarding th® 11ns and garrisoning Bsim.ru 
These, as they pointed out* wore not merely Inter­
ferences with Chines# sovereignty* but interferences 
in excess of anything whicr. the damans could claim 
under their Shantung; arrangements• They hopod you 
would consent to di sousa this relatively unimportant ^  
aspect of the Shantung proto lam tomorrow at 11 o* clock*"''
Th® day of decision for Hlppon arrived on April Z9th 
and the last point in disagreement was the issue of guarding 
the Shantung railways. Chi ml a and Makino took the stand that 
since the fom%v German owners had enjoyed extraterritorialty, 
the same provision should apply to the Japanese owners to in- 
elude control over the railway police* Both the President 
and Mr* Balfour rejected this theory* Mr* Wilson stated that 
sine# the Japanese already had control over the Board of Direc­
tors* they eould In turn control the appointments to the rail­
way police force without requiring such « stipulation in the 
Peace Treaty* Mr# Balfour, who seemed to have the most suc­
cess with the Mjllc&do's delegates* stepped into the scene and 
told the Japanese that flhe was surprised at the ton© of the
present conversation* and that he understood "that the inten-¥
u  or, of Japan was fully to restore Chinese sovereignty within 
the leased territory, and only to retain rights which were 
economic in. character**^ After considerable discussion
-;,0'::.aker, op, clt,4 III, pp. 312-313.
"Paris Peace Conference# V# p. 331*
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over the police issue, Mr, Balfour nada tm  following propo* 
sals
X* Tiie declared policy of Japan, is to hand Tuck 
to China. in full sovereignty the Shantung Peninsula 
and to retain only the economic privileges poeae^ssd 
by Germany*
2* Any employment of special police on the rail­
way is merely fce give the owners of fee railway aeou- 
rity for traffic and will bo used for no other purpose*
3* Such Japanese Instructors as may be required to 
assist in policing the railway may be selected by the
company*v2
fhe meeting adjourned with the two delegates stating that
they wnXd give the proposal their serl ous c c u b  i c ora ti on* At
6s30 P*M, j, that same day, Mr# Balfour advised the President
fcmt the Wronnoso accepted in substance the draft of the amend-
merits* Wilson returned a note to Balfour giving hie final
re-wording of the amendment* Th® formula, ms approved by tha
Council and the Tokyo delegation reads
X* The policy of Toper is to hand back the Shan­
tung Peninsula ix* full sovereignty to Chirm ro twining 
only the economic privileges granted to Germany and 
the rlt$it to establish a, settlement under the usurl 
conditions at Telngtao*
2* The owners of the hallway will use the special 
police only to ensure security for traffic* They will 
be used for no other purposes*
3* The Police Force will be composed of Clunsse, 
and such Japanese instructors as the Directors of the 
Hallway may ^elect will, be ■appointed by the Chinese 
Gove rumen t*^ *>
s a f a r i s  Peace € o n fp ro n o a » V , p* 335# 
5^ibid*# p* 363*
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The last steps for the settlement of the Shantung con-* 
trover cy wore taken on April 30th* K&klno and Chine!a felt 
that their countries should receive reimbursement for the ex** 
penaes involved In keeping between ii-,000 and 5,000 'reman 
prlHonors-of-war* This cost Mas unilateral since only a very 
fms Japanese were captured by the Germans* After Mr* George 
explained that If Japan put In such a claim, other nations 
would want o.1mlliar considerations, Maklno replied that he 
would net press the issue* Tha final step involved was the 
presentation of tha draft of the Articles fox* Incorporation 
into the Treaty concerning the disposition of tha German 
rights and property in Klaoohow* Th© Japanese draft became
the basic for Articles 156 and 13? of tha Treaty of Ver-
„ 5ix 
Bailie©#' 4
Th® Shantung settlement caused great consternation &~
mong th© Chinese delegation and in fact, China later refused
eje*
to sign th© Treaty* Be act! or* against President Wilson was 
equally hitter and th© American proas by large, cond ©timed him 
for giving in. to tha Tokyo delegation# Wilson felt that the 
settlement was the bast that could be obtained under the cir­
cumstances and expressed the hop© that the League of nations
•P „
-* PflfleiG* jg£* cl t» * p» 2b 2*
c'r*
'"••'■'WOOQ , op* cl i* # p, 21*
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would mediate tho abrogation of all foreign ri*£its and In- 
toreata In China.'*0
A further source of friction botwoon the United States 
and Japan arose over the little island of Zap* This ieland, 
located in the Carolines, was the center for the German cable 
to the Dutch Bast Indies# Shanghai and Guam* Through Guam, 
th# cable connected with th# American*owned Pacific cubic 
which provided a comsiunic & ti on network to the United States 
and across the Atlantic to the Gorman cable system* By con-
trolling Zap, the Japanese could virtually tie up all common- 11
Icationa to the Orient* On April 21at and ©gain on May 1st, 
Wilson made oral x*#aeinraliens that Zap should not be included 
in the Japanese Mandate* Nevertheless, the Japanese were 
awarded s mandate over the former German islands north of the 
equator on Hay ?th and lap was not excepted from the Mandate* 
Tlx er# is a Iso not any official record tlx at the President made 
an object!on at trio time of the award* This controversy con­
tinued until it was finally resolved st the Washington Con­
ference -In l0rZ2.J^
In summary, the Japanese nation fared quite well at 
the Purls Peace Conference. Although the demand for racial
■^Dairor, 0£. clt*. III, pp* 31?-316. 
r**7
** Paris Peace Conference, V, pp. 506-508| Quincy Wriy#it, 
Mandates ^uTer the^Te ague of Hit! ons (Chi c a go i The Uni varsity
go'~T re  a a , ™19.J?JT7pp ♦ 1 r3 — «
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equality to b© included as a provision in the Treaty was not 
met, Nippon gained her other two objectivesj continued con­
trol over the Islands which ah© occupied and the transfer of 
the German leasehold in Shantung*
CHAPTER VI
THE WASHINGTON CCNFEHEKCE
The Peris Peace Conference left unsolved many Issues 
arising out of the World War, One of the great areas of 
tension was in the Orient where neither China nor Japan was 
entirely satisfied with the post-war developments. The Chi­
nese delegation refused to sign the Versailles Treaty and 
left Paris an route to Peking with the firm conviction that 
their country had been abandonee to the whims of the Japan­
ese,^ The Tokyo delegation returned home flushed with vic­
tory, having gained all of the desired objectives except for 
that of having racial equality written into the Covenant of 
the League of Nations# The Kaaumlgaaeki, or Japanese Foreign 
Office, had to face equally vexing probl&^m in the immediate 
post-war period# Tokyo * s relations with Washington had rap­
idly deteriorated over the PIberian Intervention, the Shan­
tung settlement, and the mandate of the island of Tap•^ A 
new source of irritation and a blow to the Japanese pride 
arose over the question of restriction of immigration to the 
United States# The news of alien land laws and other meas­
ly ood, o£# clt#, pp• 1,35-137•
^Latouretto, op, cit,, pp# 320-521*
uree directed a g & ln s t ino Japanese in California inc©nsed
the Kippones© newspapers to almost hysteric©! proportions
3.
and served to foster ant .1 ~&zmr loan fool Inga*
Gelations bo tween London and Tokyo were also Lai rig re- 
vali’. a ted • The Japanese military, political and industrial 
leaders favored renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance which 
bad brought theft partieIpafcicm in the war* a staunch ally in 
the peace ■negotiations and international prestige in the Far 
East* Britain, on the other hand, viewed the forthcoming re­
newal with hi xed feel !ng«u tilppon, with the third large at 
navy In the world was already challenging British spheres of
influence in Chin© and Jstoglepd1 $ benefits froft the hiXlance
were by no means o omen© urate to thoee gained by her p a r t ­
n e r*  Mr* Lloyd George* w h ile  aware o f America*3  anxiety 
o ver B r i t i s h  o b lig a t io n s  in  the  e v e n t o f  a w ar betw een the  
B a ite d  S ta te s  and Japan* dec id ed  In favor o f  ren ew al and 
g r a d u a lly  won ©11 of the Dominion .Brim© M in is te rs  to  his 
v ie w p o in t except Mr* Jan Mnuia o f  Mouth A f r ic a  who favored a 
r e v is io n  o f  the J ro & ty  and 4r* Arthur ^Seighen o f  Gan&da who 
proposed outright a b ro g a tio n  and p laced  Genad© a t  the  side
1
o f the Gultad Btates.** In an effort to  allay the suspicion
^ o r e L  * halations of the United it©tec. 1920 {hashing- 
ton: o* g* n u m 3 9 a t  greeting office, I93&)* XI i, pp. 17-13.
h‘nlaymond L* Buell, The Washington Goafar©nee (Kew Fork: 
J. Appleton and Qo., 192£)7V."lZgi" S a w S i a T  obT elt.. p. £90
«.■ • -.a • •.'• red ncr , * o&n&u«& * tne a ng 1 o—J© pm las o alliance aim tu© 
Washington Conference,H I oil t leal do tenge Quarterly, L (March, 
1935}# p. 33. **" " “
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of the United States and Canada, the two Alliance nations 
Presented a Joint declaration to the League of nations in 
Which, they recognized that the Treaty, while In * harmony” 
with the spirit of the League, was not entirely consistent 
with the letter of the Covenant* The declaration went on t© 
say that if the Alliance was renewed by the two partners, it 
must be In a form consistent with the Covenant***
The most vexing post-war defense problem to Japan was 
the naval construction race* The Havel Service Appropriation 
Act of 1916 embarked the United States on an ambitious build­
ing program which would give America a naval fleet second to
f
none*0 The Japanese Government planned an neight-eight” con­
struction program of eight battleahlpa and eight battle cruis­
ers but, for reasons of economy, the project was reduced in 
1916 to eight battleships and four cruisers# Later, in 1919, 
the Tokyo Government, following the lead of Washington and 
London, reinstituted the original plan*^
Following the war and peace provisions, sentiments de­
veloped In London and Washington for a reduction in the shlp-
^Raymond L# Buell, The Washington Conference {Hew York: 
Dm Appleton and Co*, 1922), pp*' 152-133*
.^Benjamin H* Williams, The Uni ted States and Pi sarma- 
raent (Hew Yorks HeGraw-Hill BooE Co*,"1 neT7 T§3ll# PP* T33-336,
^Ichihaaki Yaraoto, The Washington Conference and After 
(Stanford University; StanJK^^HI’versl%",Tf?^aJ’"X9s2BTr p* If*
b u ild in g  program of toe throe nations a only Ha a ut a tautlaXly 
reduced* In eimiliar' vain, Lord Lae of Faren&m, ’^irat ford 
o f  tm  Admiralty, cage®ated a naval understanding with the
A
United 0 bates on bus baa Is of parity*
The White House announced on July 10th that the Gov­
ernments of Great Hr 1tala, Japan, France and Italy had been 
approached to ascertain whet tier or not they would be willing
to participate in a conference to consider limitation of
armament and the  problem s o f  the ^ a r  f a s t  and th e  taolflo*
Tlie a d d it io n  of the latter element was In c lu d e d  by £earotary
o
C h arles  o# Hughe® a t  the  s u g g e s tio n  o f Lord Curzon* / A c tu ­
a l l y  fu rs o n  wanted a p rcX l.n l nary  m eeting betw een re p re s e n ta ­
t iv e s  o f London, Tokyo and W ashington In  ordex* to  p repare  an  
agenda b u t le e re b a ry  Hughes was adamant and d e c la re d  th a t  he
ruled o at fi a moot trig which would partake o f the nature o f a
■If)p r e lim in a ry  ocmfe-rtmc©**' This was fo llo w e d  by for.'.'.ml lnvl«
tations to Tokyo and other Interested gavernuants ana which
ware extended by Ire s  I  dent H ardin:' on August X I ,  19X1* IX
ton:
47*
Nippon viewed such wide discusslonw with great auapl«
n delations o f the U n ite d  ft*t*s, 1921 (Waehino
“ —  - — - ——    --------- - ***•<*»,w.*»m Wit.tfWW.tnH.           - 
lovovnmnt Xrtntlug Office, 1936), I, p* dj* 
Griswold, op* alt#, op* 293-296* 
iu?oFe Ign Ac la t Iona of the United Ota tea, 1921, I, pp. id.
el on* S erne newspaper* declared that the conference invita­
tion cheated a national orials* While the lies of an a w *  
mont reduction program gained. rsady aoeept&ncs by the Japan­
ese public* the inclusion of Far Eastern and Peelfie affaire 
urns not considered as a logical approach by the Japanese mind* 
Tn& Foreign Ministry tealtatad In. accepting ffarte blenohe 
fcte inofunion of dissuasion of far Baateam matters until "pare* 
cicely Inf ©mod of the nature and scope of tiiem problems*11 
Secretary Hughes thereupon decided to sound out the views? of 
Lord Cur a on i he particularly wanted to tmc&r whether any sug­
gestion af topics had a Ira a %  been made in Tokyo* C u n  on re­
plied that he thought that the conference should be limited 
to di souse ion of the 1,1 open door,11 the territorial integrity 
of China, Shantung* mud wlosseJ territory in and around the 
Pacific Ocean** The British wanted to eliminate from the dis­
cussion such tm% tore at opium traffic, immigration, *pesses« 
slons of Germany In the Pacific,* (i*e*, mandated areas}, and 
the integrity of Russia,*^ itughea thereupon advised the Japan­
ese Government of the general nature of the topics but held 
off on pro paring a definite agenda, expressing the hope that 
the Japanese Government * would net press Its inquiry in this
matter because of the desirability of complete acceptance 
of thim Government* a lnvi tat ion, leaving open to later do#* 
termination the exact agenda/’^ * Tokyo reluctantly agreed 
to attend the Cenferenea with this qualification that 91 the 
agenda thereof should be arranged In accordance with the 
main object of the discussions as above defined, and that 
introduction therein of problems such as are of sole concern 
to certain particular power® or such matters that mmj be re­
garded accomplished facto should be scrupulously avoided#^® 
Hlppon9* dileiKia was expressed in the following article 
which c ons&en ted s
* * , the tone of the Japanese press indicated that 
the invitations had come as somewhat of a shock* The 
outstanding difficulties between Japan and the United 
State®, involving the Conference issue; the objection 
of the United States to the Pacific mandates north of 
the kquator accorded Japan by the Peae& Conference, 
especially as regard a the cable rights of Yap; the 
disapproval of Japan*s policy toward China and Siberia, 
and the alleged tendency of the 'United states to en­
courage the Chinese in their anti-Japanese campaign-- 
all these, complicated by mutual distrust and the in­
crease of naval armaments on both sides, made President 
Harding*a Invitation a not altogether agreeable sur­
prise far Japan# # « .16
The delegation selected by the government to travel 
to Washington consisted of Havy Minister Baron {and Admiral)
102
Kate" Xtt&oaahurof ilmxm of Peers President Prtnee Tokugawa | 
Ambassador to the Uni tad States* Baron Shi de here Kijurof 
Viee Foreign Minis ter Eanih&ra Mas arm* The delegation was
eeeompenied by over seventy legal# military* technical and 
administrative assistants* Prince Tofcugawa later commented
that the delegation was not equal in education and experience
to that of ntm® of the other leading powers.^
The basic ins true ti one to the delegation were prepared
by the Gaiko Choeakal end provided that: (1) I'll pp on is pr#*
pared to -accept a curtails fit of her naval armament as long
as the national security Is not Impaired thereby; (2) She
has no establishments in the Pacific 'Which threaten the ae*
curity of other nations nor did she intend to make any; (3)
She was prepared to conclude an agreement to abolish all mil*
itary and naval establishments in the Pacific that would
threaten Hie peace and would abandon the military construe*
fcion already started; (if.) Japan was ready to extend the
open door policy to lap; (5 ) the principle of the open door
would also apply to China* £6) the Shantung issue would on*
1 A.
ly be discussed by direct negotiation with China.
By September 10* 1921# the United States ikyvernment
had prepared the draft of an agenda which was later approved
17'Yanaga* op. cit*, p. 419# citing Tokugawa Xyes&to.
*K&fvL Kaigi ni tariurtTTbron,'1 Talyo* (March# 1922)# pp. 98*99.
i9Tak«uohi, o£. olt.. p. 233.
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by tha nation* attending the me©ting subject to the qua Ilf I* 
fter&iou that additional Items isight be introduced:
I* Li&iitation of Neval ktmazmntf under which ahali
be discussed:
a* Basis of limitation* 
o • -. U. t’©n v *
e * FulTi X listen t *
11# Buies for control of new agencies of warfare.
T il. Liiai ta il on of iBiid armament*
I’AOX.*, „U> iW.f i W*‘ j* g, W -il W-X*
X* questions relating W  China*
1* fMneiplee to be applied*
2* Application*
ft• ferrltori el Into grity* 
b* Adminietrs live Integrity, 
e* Open door— equality of ec on orJ.c and in- 
due trial opportunity* 
d* Coneassicns9 monopolies, or preferential 
economic privileges* 
a* Development of railways* Including plans 
relating to Chinese hastern Railway, 
f* Preferential railroad rates* 
g* Status of existing eoasml ttmanta.
XX* 31 barIu (airulliisr headings)
XXI* htiivlated I elan do (Ciacuetsi on of those quests ons 
not settled by earlier discussions)*
ShhCOTCAl. COMmttCATIOHS Iff TEE PACIFIC
A discussion of unsettled questions involving 
the nature and ©cope of corarai tteacn ts underQ 
which claims of rights mifilht be ««tar tad*
lo
Xcurerenoo on the Limits&L >,< of ,.r'nsoaui,
:<ovcinber xf» Ihcl - Dobrusry 6, Xxu.<. (Washington: 'JnivO > w*
^ V , “  r01tlnp ■Crf F C o ¥ r i ^ 2 X T T w^  10* Horcaftor o*.t#d as 
^ojifereoce on the Limitation of Armament) *
10k
The opening session began on November 12, 1921, with 
Mr* Charles Evans Hughes pr@ai.ding* President Harding offi­
cially we 1 coxaed the delegates an! then left the hall, turn­
ing the meeting over to his Secretary of State* Hr* Hughes 
then launched Into & speech which was marked by the absence 
of the platitudes and generalities usually presented In an 
opening session*2® Hr* Hughes went directly into the heart 
of the matter by presenting a proposal for- the limitation of 
armaments and designed:
* . • the core of hie difficulty is to be found 
in the competition in naval programs, and that In 
order appropriat©ly to limit naval armament, com­
petition in Its production must be abandoned. * . *
Thore la only one adequate way and that is to end 
It now.
It l a  apparent that this cannot bo accomplished 
without serious sacrifices* Enormous sums have boon 
©rporido I upon ship a under construction and building 
program® which era now under way cannot be given up 
withoui heavy loss, bet if the present construction 
of capital ships goes forward, other ships will in­
evitably be built to rival them and this will lead 
to others* Thxm the race will continue so long as 
ability to continue lasts* ihe effort to escape 
sacrifices la futile. W© must face them or yield 
our purpose*4-!
Mr* Hughes went on to state that "it would also seem to be a 
vital p a r t  of g plan for the limitation of naval armament
2vI»s. bcoi^tts | o£* ci t». p. S>22.
21Conference on the Himl tation of Armament* p. 5d*
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that there should be a naval holiday, it is proposed that
for a period of not later than ten years, there should be no
22further construction of capital ships.” " The Secretary al­
so detailed the s p e c i f i c  kvmvlean, feri11sh and Japanese ships 
that should be scrapped. The entire assembly hall %ms elec­
trified by the sweeping proposals presented in such an un­
expected and dramatic manner. Sullivan states that Admiral 
Beatty of the British Navy 11 came forward in his chair with 
the manner of e bulldog sleeping on e sunny porch who had 
been hit in the stomach by the fo o t  of an 1 t  Am*x*ant v o u p  cin- 
veeser *M^  Another writer states that the Japanese took Mr* 
Hughes1 speech "without the flicker o f  an. eye,” while Current 
History* to the contrary, described the Nipponese as " sur­
prise
The first agreement concluded at the Conference was 
the Four Bower Pact, the terms of which were announced to 
the press on December 10th* The xiewapapers and indeed, many
22*. HArms Conference in Action, Current History, XV 
No. 3 (December, 1921), pp* xxx-xl.
^^Williams, op. cit., p. iWi* citing Mark. Sullivan,
Tbs Great Advantage at Washington (Hew York: Doubleday,
Pag© and CoTT^T^SsT, pp. 2/-2B.
^Williams, op. cit,, p. 114*., citing Ida M. Tar be 11, 
Peacemakers-Blessed and Otherwise (Hew far*: The KacmilIan
C o  1922 57 pTTJ5; Current His fcory. XV, op. cit*. p. x x .
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of the delegates wore taken by surprise nine© the matters
2*~j
cohered in the Fact were not In eluded in the agenda* U®*»
gotiuiione between Britain and to# Uniy-ed states began on
the evening prior to toe first coufexeuoe session* then two
of the Japanese delegates called upon Hr# Balfour to discuss
the- renewel of too /.nglo-Jepane*a Alliance, Balfour dumb-
foiniosd them by telling toe delegate® that be was oonsi dering
the replacement cf the Alliance with a tripartita agreement
and had already given too Uni ted States Government a draft of
swc'a a proposal# *"'
Seer#tery ZIughe© wanted to broaden the Fact to Include
Franco# Thm iU&erlcans wanted to win Franc# over to accepting
hex* nave 1 ratio and also felt it desirable to generalize the
responslb*11 ties mrnmr tou fruaby* uhlX® neither Britain nor
Japag wanted to include rsris on the grounds that it would
dilute tho of * o c ft.fi. vsMSi ox to^ faot9 by beeember 7ton both
nations agroto to pormlt too fourth member ta enter Into to# 
P7nbgct'i oti one* '*f in too meantime, xtaiy learned of too meet­
ings and stood tost too be included* however. Bushes turned 
down tto xiog„:.xoi on the ground & tout the Berne Government did
" Jonn Chalmers Vinson, The jtorohmant Peace * (Athens;
Tkm University of G e o rg ia  F r a s W T 7'P P * ^ 5 2•
26Ich± haah!, op. cit., n, 121.* 4tWW*'v*. «»'**'»» ##*■#. ^
27ibia.
10?
pA
not h&v« possessions in the Orient* The final discussions 
pertaining to the Four-* Power Treaty took place in the hom® 
of Secretary Hughes on December Sth and 9th* At the first 
of those meetings* Baron Shidehant proposed an emendfoent 
which provided that two or the powers could *in mutual a~ 
greemont with each other^ invite the regaining contracting 
parties to a joint conference* Hughes auaptoiened that tna 
Hippo no m  were using this as a means to continue the Anglo** 
Japanese Alliance and declared that this proposal was not 
acceptable**^
%  the term* of Artie it 'X of the Treaty, the four na­
tions agreed to nrespect their rights in relation to their In* 
aular puuaasalona and Insular dominion* in the region of the 
Pacific Ocean*" They would further consult If there should 
develop Ma qqxiiravoray arising out of any Pacific question 
and Involving the!r laid rights*1 Article XI provided that 
the Powers would, In the event of a threat by an outside 
Power* ooiOTunioat® Kith ©me another fully ana frankly In or* 
dor to arrive at an understanding ms to the most efficient 
measures to be taken* Jointly or separately* to meet the ex*
^Xehlhftofcl* o£> elt* * p* 121*
29
'Vinson* on. cl  t »* ;o* 156*
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lg.nei.st of th« particular situation.3*' Japan fall Into the 
category of an insular possession under the terms of the 
Treaty end many Japanese took it as an affront tha t the Trea­
ty wshould be Interpreted aa obligating the ether eor.tracting 
parties to extend even a moral assistance to the safeguarding 
of the territorial Integrity of Japan proper*n 3X The Treaty 
was later amended to do fine Japan* s insular possessions to 
include "only Karafuto* Formosa* the Pescadores and the is­
lands under the Mandate of J a p a n U n d e r  Article IV, the 
Anglo-Japanese Alliance was terminated* and thus a greet 
source of concern to the united States was removed. Senator 
Lodge, In summarising the effect of this termination declared 
that It "was necessary to the successful conclusion of the 
navel t r e a t y The Nipponese delegation* obviously not 
happy over the outcome, dismissed the announcement of the 
now work with a brief statement that Japan would approve the 
treaty and that the Anglo-J&p&nea# Alliance "had done much
*t
for the preservation of peace and liberty*®-
3€xraatlas and fteaolotions of the Conference on the Lim­
its fc ion of Arms me n tPTN a w Yorks Federal Trade*~Tn?ormetion Serv­
ice, 1922T* "ppl »
^Xiyoshl K. Kawakaml* Japan*g Pacific Policy (New 
Yorks E.T. Dutton and. Co., 1922), ’pT £5"! ~
3^Trea ties and Hesolutions of the Conference on the bim- 
i ta 1 i on of A rma mer. t * u. 29 •
33Ichih*shi, oc, cit.. p. 13?.
3Prbid. . p. 136.
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The negotiations for arriving at armament limitations 
comm©need on Uovember 19th with a meeting between l-fr* Hughes, 
Baron IC&to and Mr* B&lfour* 3aron Kato suggested that naval 
experts ffo-i tns bares countries fores. a aub-co.unittee to ex­
amine toe American proposal of a >-3~3 ratio of capital 
ships* This co;&mitte-e was composed of Admiral Goonts and 
Captain Pratt for the 'Jriltal States; Admiral Beatty and Hear 
Admiral Chetflaid for Britain; flea Admiral Kato and Captain 
tfyeda for J a p a n . the group had no aoonex* met than it be­
came deadlocked over tha issue of tha ratio and Admiral K&fc’o 
issued the following public statement on Movemb©r £3th!
Owing to her geographical situation and to her 
peculiar national conditions, the imperative need 
of a navy is recognised by Japan in no leas degree 
than by any other couritry; but Japan is resolved 
not to possess orntamtmts in excess of the minimum 
strength for the bare necessity of insuring her 
national security* Japan is unable to accept the 
ratio of 60 per cent, because so.@ considers it in** 
possible to provide for her security and defense with 
any fore© less than 70 per cent. Hats desires to 
have the proposed ratio modified so that the relative 
strength of the tore© navies will be 10-1 0 -?#
Mr. Balfour later called upon Baron Kato and expressed 
his disappointment that Japan could not agree with the pro-
3f’Xehihashi, pp. alt*, p. %?.
3 h o  Id.,- 3 . i*8 .
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posed retie and hoped that some wmy could be found to contin­
ue the negotiations end arrive at a settlement* Balfour 
asked Kato* if he had any mrggestlexia In which, moons could bo 
found to reconcile the difference** The Baron replied that 
he could not act contrary to the considered opinion of his 
advisors nor against his government's wishes, however, he 
would do the best he- could to break the deadlock* Ha to* went 
on to say that his country would ilk# to see the “Settau* 
substituted for the *Matsu* which was scheduled to be scrap­
ped in the proposal submitted by the Americans* Kato also ex-
pressed the desire of an agreement concerning the Pacific 
fort!f■ication# ^
The following day, in a meeting with the other members 
of the *Slg Three,11 the Tokyo delegate reiterated his deal re­
fer a 10-10-? ratio by deelaringt
A word as to the r?ffutsu*rl She was completed a
month ago and is fully equipped and manned* She was 
commissioned yosterday and has Joined tha fleet*
But according to the American proposal she Is in the 
list of ships to be scrapped* I mast have good reasons 
for scrapping her* I face a situation at once serious 
and difficult] on# on# hand, I desire a h a monlous 
conclusion on the limitation] and. on the other hand, I 
must be equipped with reasons which will enable me to 
explain to the satisfaction of Japan. So far, X have 
been unable to find any means whereby mutual satisfac­
tion can b® obtained*
^Xohlhashi, o p * oit** p* I4.9#
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However, I said yesterday to Hr* Balfour, should 
it foe- possible for the Powers situated In tha Pacific, 
particularly the United States and Japan, to maintain 
the status quo ©n their Pacific fortifications and 
navaT^aeeaj 'liiat would give xm reason to satisfy the 
Japanese people*38
Hr* Balfour followed by declaring that Orest Britain was not 
entirely satisfied with the rati© either, but that M e  coun­
try was willing i© accept with, the desires of other states in 
an attempt for further disarmament* The committee did not 
meet again until December 12th at Which time Kate reported 
that hm received Instructions from his Government In which 
lippon would accept a 10-10-6 rati© provided that there was a 
clear understending that the Powers,tIncluding Japan), would 
maintain the status quo of the Pacific fortifications. Rato 
continued M s  Oovernment1® instructions by advising that toe 
w-a was already 100$ ecmpXsted and In fact had made her 
first ©rule© of over 2,500 illea* Tim delegate argued that 
the Japanese people would not understand the reason for scrap­
ping a Ship that was already eomrslssloxied and that It would be 
a blow to the moral® of the Japanese Havy* However, it would 
be possible to scrap the Settsu as a substitute*^ Mr* Hughes 
countered Rato’s proposition by declaring that the subatltu-
I chi ha chi, op* cit** pp* 50-51.
39X M d .. pp. 52-?3.
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tlon of a post-Jutland type ship would upset toe entire plan 
since it would mmmi that America would want to be compensated 
with aiwillar appropriate imhatlfcutiona* In line with this, 
HUghea later proposed that the United States 'keep to# Califor­
nia end Washington and replace those ships with to# Horto Da­
kota and to® Delaware which in tonnage would amount to fifteen 
Amerlcan ships to nine of the- Japanese, with a maximum limita­
tion of 3 5# D00 tons eaeh**^
It was now toe turn for Britain to make her claim and 
Balfour proposed that England retain toe two #Super-Hoods” 
of 50,000 tons each. Balfour Justified this action on the 
grounds that the plans had already been drawn and if substi­
tution of style imn required, new plans would take over a. year 
to accomplish*^ A compromise agreement was finally reached 
on December 15th In which Great Britain was allowed to scrap 
four "King George V” typo ships and build two "Super-Hood a* 
of 35,000 ton© each*. Even at this, Great Britain would have 
a total of 587,000 tons of capital ship# against >25,000 far 
the United States* Finally, both the Uni.ted State# and Great 
Britain were limited to 525,000 replacement tonnage while
^Xohllmshl, o£, ©it** p* 55*
4l2 M l « »  p » 56.
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Japan wmm allowed 3151000* Tha agreements concerning Franc© 
ami Italy arc not of particular slgniflcane a to this thesis, 
however, after extended ne-*50tiation®f both France and I taly 
agreed to a limitation of ten capital ahlpa with the replace­
ment tonnage eatabllahed at 1?5,000*^ Agreementa were also 
reached limiting the else of Aircraft Carrlera to 10,000 tonsj 
regulating the of submarines In the attack of commercial 
ships and a prohibition against the us© of noxious gases
The agreements concerning the status quo of naval for­
tifications and bases In the Pacific provided:
The United State®, the British Umpire and Japan 
agree that the status quo at the time of the sign­
ing of the present treaty* with regard to fortifica­
tions and naval bates, shall be meintainei in their 
respective territories and post©salon® specified 
hereundert
1* The Insular possessions which the United States 
now holla or may hereafter acquire In the Pacific 
Ocean, except (a) those ad jacent to the coast of the 
Uni ted * &tes, Alaska, and the Panama Canal 2one , not 
Xncludt  ^ the Aleutian Islands, and (b) the Hawaiian 
Ialanda*
2* Hongkong and the insular possessions .which the 
z*ri tiah. Empire ’now hold a or may .hereafter acquit in 
the Pacific Ocean, east of the Meridian of 110 degrees 
east lengtitude, except (a) those adj&cent to the 
coast of Canada, Cb) the Commonwealth of Australia 
and it# territories, and (c)  Sew Zealand*
3* The following Insular territories and possessions 
of Japan in the Pacific Ocean, to wits the Kuril* Is­
land a, tha Bonin I ©lands, Araami -Oahlma, the booohoo
42r
Li mi ta tie:
Treaties and hasolutions of ftbe Conference on the
sament
1*3ibid., pp* 22-26.
Islands, Formosa, and the Pescadores, and any in­
sular territories or possessions in the Pacific 
Ocean which J&o&n may hereafter acquire •> ji •» i
In addition to the written agreement, the Favera agreed to 
apply the status quo to Guam, the Philippines, Hongkong,
| <M
AuauI**OshIa&, the Boolna, Formosa, and the Pescadores
Tue terras of the Treaty were especially significant 
to Japan sinea the nearest base where the United Dt&tes 
could strengthen her existing fo.rtifieafcions was Hawaii, & 
distance of over 3,000 miles to Tokyo* at the a&me time, 
Japan wan secure from an attack by Great Britain* This pro­
vision, together wItU the armament limitation program gave 
Tokyo a reasonable degree of eeeurlfcy and Baron fCato, In a 
speech before the Japan society of Bow fork summarised his 
Joveruneat’ s viewpoint:
1 think it is possible fox* me to say with reason­
able certainty that the Conference on Disarmament has 
succeed** d beyond the hope a of those who called It 
Into being, and* in this connection, I nave in mind 
your great Presideat, was a&nf done no much far this 
cause of internatioaal peace*k%>
One of the most serious problems at the Conference 
concerned the settlement of tha Issues involving Chirm and
^ T r e a ties. and Be solutions of the Conference on the 
L Ini tat loo of Armment'T pp**"Tca^lj* ~~ * * ■
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her strainad fixations with Japan. Indeed, ireaidant Hording 
commented that "thare existed with regard to the Far East 
causes of mi a understanding and sources of aontraveray which 
constituted a eertoaa potential danger* The so difficulties 
centered prIncIpally about China., where the developments of 
the peat quarter of a century had produce<1 a situation In 
which international rivalries, Jealousies# distrust, and an- 
ta.||onl« were Teetered*"^?
The Toledo dale atlon did not went to deal with any
n a t t e r s  that were already a f a i t  accom pli*  Japan however,
had made several overtures f u r  settlement o f  the Shantung
problem and made several proposals to the Seltlnn government
IlBfor the opening of direct negotiations* *' China did n o t want 
to open direct talks on the feme la that it Implied a form of 
recognition of Japan’s status In the peninsula* China’s bar­
gaining position was already weakened by the prestige of Japan, 
gained during the naval arma limitations discussions and pub­
lic opinion somewhat ofcarsged In favor of Nippon* nevertheless, 
China hoped to gain three oonoeeetonst tariff autonomy, tha 
return of Shantung and cancellation of the Twenty-One ,De-
b-7
* s . H* Jaw, Inteyaa.t.lpnal gelatlone Since the i'ew# 
Treaties (Londons ilacmHIin and 'Co. ^ Tj8s377 op.'*TSiJ-TSy
Wood, op* oit*, pp. 220«*23&,
mands#4*^ *3.6
The tariff concession!? granted to the European Sonora
and iippoia .had long worked & disadvantage to tha Chinas#
Gove rnment# Sine a tha signing of tha treaty of lank trig of 
X % 2 § China had boon raqui.rod to limit her tariff to 5% ad 
valorem rat# on both imports and exports* While It «a® 
originally agreed that this tax would b# modified com^nsu* 
rat# to tho rise and fall of prices# there ware no revieions 
bet%reen the years 1853 and 1902# and between. 1902 and 1918*50 
Yet the? Power# did not he#Ifcabe to set their tariff rat# for 
Imports at from Z$% to 100$ ad valorem# fn addition, Coins 
had a tax in the amount of 2§$ which was collected by trie 
various provincial gov#mors for all goods pasting in transit# 
This tax or likin weakened China*® oaae tine© Great Britain, 
the United states and Japan agreed in 1902 and 1903 to pay a 
l£f$ ©us to ait fee If the Ilk In was abolished# This was never 
accomplished and her net return was decreasing with cash 
rise in prices
Br* Eoo presented a request for tax revision to the 
Council on Hoveaber 23, 1921, proposing a 1E|S duty and
**%uell# op* cit* # ppm 21^ 2~2qS*
£GIbid., 21.2-3*3.
Abolition of the Xlkln. The matter mass referred to a sub-
C o m i t  too which x^corsasended an Xnorecee of 2|# which could
bo Inc remind for luxury goods. Ao ambiguous provision
was included la the Treaty which was signed on February 22,
1922, and provideds
"within three months, a special Conference shall 
meet in China to tax# Immediate ctepe . . * to pre­
pare the way for tb& abolition of t*ie Ilk in tax and 
raising tha tariff to 12| per cent* • T T 5 ^
Khile this was not considered a satisfactory settlement by 
China, It nevertheless represented a marked improvement*
Kith reference to the shantung is .sue, it «*&« useless 
for Peking to bring tha matter before the Conference since 
six out of nine rowers already adhered to the- Treaty of Ver­
sailles* The way was opened for negotiations between the two 
hostile countries when the British and Auerloan delegations 
proposed that they furnish observers who would sit In on the 
talk:: tiiu Insure that Chins was not Intimidated by Japan*
The faking delegation agreed to this proposal on h'oveuber 
30th. The main points at issue wore the disposition of Jap­
anese property (Including the former Oernan holdings)* and 
control over the ?slngtAO-?9ln*nfu Jallroad* This line had 
been valued at ■?, 32,000*000 silver dollars sad her many was 
credited with this amount in her reparation account* The
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Peking delegation agreed to pay this amount in a meeting held 
on December l^th, provided that Japan would then immediately 
relinquish control. The Tokyo group rejected this offer 
and proposed that China borrow the money from Japan, repay­
ing it back over a period of twenty years. They further 
proposed that Nipponese experts be assigned the positions of 
Chief Engineer, Chief Accountant and Traffic Manager. China
made a counter-offer of furnishing Treasury Notes which would
r
be payable over a twelve year period. This was unacceptable 
to Japan and the delegation now proposed that China make a
cash payment with the purchase price to be paid in Mexican ;
-!
dollars and deposited in a neutral bank. To this, China 
suggested that payments be mad© ©very three months over a nine 
month period. This was rejected and the conference adjourned 
sine die on December 20, 1921. Negotiations reopened on 
January 5th only to break up again the following day over a
53
simlXl&r deadlock.
k compromise settlement was hastened by the news that
United State® Senator Walsh introduced a resolution calling
upon the President to furnish information as to the state of
St
the Shantung negotiations. ^ The Japanese war© aware of the
53Sue1 1 , op. clt.. pp. 2 5 5-2 6 0 . 
5ttibld., p. 2 6 1 .
fact that tha Senate would hardly ratify tha Maval Treaty 
If an agreement could not be found concerning Shantung* In 
a final &gr#©manfc, China waa to pay Japan trie assessed val­
uation of tha railroad witvi Treasury Kotos which might be 
spread over a fifteen year period* Public propertiea eon- 
atrue tod by Japan wore also to be reimbursed by China with 
the provision that no paysent was to be made for former Car­
man property* This was later followed by an mgtmmmnt to 
withdraw all Japanese troops from the Tsingfcao-fsinanfu 
railroad zonm and by hay 4 th* all Nipponese troops had been 
withdrawn*'*3*
China* on December 14th, submitted her demand for the 
abrogation of the Treaties of 1915# (based upon the Twenty- 
One Demand®}• The Taking delegate cited the constant stand 
that the treaties were not legally recognised by China since 
they were unilateral and inconsistent with the principles of 
the Conference* The Japanese* In a conciliatory move* a- 
greed to withdraw her reservation for later negotiations of 
Croup V of the demands» (miscellaneous demands)* and also 
agreed to forsake the question of furnishing Japanese ad­
visors or instructors on political# military or police met** 
tars in south Manchuria* After China .reserved the right
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for future action, the matter m s  dropped on February k* 
Secretary Hughes Introduced the question of the ‘’Open
D o o r”  p o l i c y  on J a n u a ry  X 6 th  b y  o f f e r i n g  a 4 r * f t  r e s o lu t io n
which re a d  in part:
W ith  a v ie w  to a p p ly in g  more e f f e c t u a l l y  tha 
p r i n c ip l e  of the open 4 o o r o r  e q u a l i t y  o f  o p p o r­
tunity for tha trad# and Industry of all n a t lo ra t ,  
th e  power# re p re s e n te d  in t h i s  c o n fe re n c e  a g re e
not to seek or support their nationals in aiaert- 
lug any arrangements which saifhfc purport to estab­
lish In favor of their Into roots any g e n e ra l su­
periority of* rights with respect to oommrotel or
econom ic  d e ve lo p m e n t I n  a n y  d e s ig n a te -  r e g io n  o f  
th e  t e r r i t o r i e s  of C h in e *57
Article Vf of the draft of the agreement provided that wany 
provisions of an existing concession which appear inconsis­
tent with thus# of another concussion or with the principles 
of the above agreemiit” nlr.ht be referred to a board of ref- 
erenoe*-5" Baron Shi debar a. objected to this provision on the 
grounds that It might Imply a retroactive application* Sir 
Hobart Borden proposed that this article be dropped and this 
was agreed upon by ta* other Power® la attendance* The 
Alne rower ‘Treaty was signed on February 6th, 1922, by ihe 
United States, Japan, Belgium, The British Aspire, China,
•’6Iohtha»hl, o^. £lt., p. 305. 
J ,Xbt<3,, pp. 1*3-1% ..■ i«*ii I I*- «>M« ■[< — * ^ — ▼
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Prance# Italy# the Batherlands and Portugal* In this Tact
the fm^TB agreed:
1 * To respect the sovereignty# the independence* 
and the territorial and adalvilstrativ* Integrity of 
China*
2 * To prov Ida the fullest and most unes&arraeaed 
opportunity to China to dawlop and maintain for her** 
siIf an effective and stable government•
3 * To us# their influx nee for the purpose of effect­
ually establishing and maintaining the principle o.f 
equal opportunity for the oommeroc and Industry of all 
nations throughout the territory of China*
!t« To refrain from taking advantage of the present 
conditions in order to see* special rights or privileges 
which would abridge the rights of the subjects or 
citizens of friendly states* and from countenancing 
motion inimical to the security of such states#2 $
Is the remaining articles# the Towers pledged to carry out
**the principles of the Open Door or equality of opportunity
in China. $13 to refrain from creating n Sphere a of .influence;*
to respect China f-& right as a neutral In cane of war? and to
consult with each other “'whenever a situation arises which
* * * Involves the application of the stipulations of the
pres# ni Treety* * ^
China was not successful in her plea for the termination
of extraterritoriality and further action was postpones until
192J* Th* lowers* including Japan* resolved to abolish all
59■ Treat!es and Resolutions of the Conference of the
*. m *  a  ""W * » m lw w y >iin*1 mmmm mu* » i* *  • n ^ m iin w n m *-  - - - t‘-—-  “------ —“ -**—— ^ ———  ---------    -
Ion .of Armament# p» 32#
°JIbld.f p* 32*
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foreign pact offices within Chinn, effective January X, 1923* 
This provision did not apply to the leased territories nor
to fcaoae areas where they were operated with the oonssnt of
An
the Chinese Cover;*m at*
The sun tier of the mandate of the le larva of Tap was 
settled in a eat la factory manner* The $cited States and Jap­
an signed a treaty on i«*ebruary 1 1, 1922, which provided that 
American citisons would be given equal footing with Japanese
subjects H n  all that relates to the landing and operation of
the existing Yap^'aem cable,” or any other a able that the
United States might construct in the future* In return,
Washington gave recognition to Tokyo1a stands te over the Is- 
land,62
The remaining issue involving the presence of Japan­
ese troops in Siberia was quickly resolved when Baron Shtde- 
Iaf6 road a fifteen minute speech in which Nippon disclaimed 
any designs on Siberia ana promised to evacuate was soon as 
a satlafactory settlement of the question shall have been 
arranged with an orderly flussian Oovernment*”
The Washington Conference did much to stabilise tho
Treaties and lie a glut Iona of the Conference of the 
Limitation of Armament". n T H l *
6t-3u«ll, 0£. alt., pp. l4.ij.S-J+49.
&3 Ibia.. p. 3 1 1.
123
peace In the Orient and better the strained relations between 
Japan on one hand and the United States and China on the 
other. The concessions made by Tokyo at Washington greatly- 
raised her stature in the eyes of the Western Powers and pro­
vided a temporary improvement in her relations with China.
The success of the Conference was largely due to the dynamic 
leadership and persuasion of* Secretary Hughes, who was assist­
ed by Mr• Balfour in many of the negotiations with the Japan­
ese. While the Conference was not a. success insofar as the 
long term effect upon SIno-Japanese relations were concerned, 
it was a far better example of the above hoard conduct of 
diplomatic negotiations than the Paris Peace Conference which 
preceded it a fdw years before.
G SA PIIn V I I
COflCLUSIuK
'Xh© chief diplomatic events which directly contributed 
to Japan9 a rise in international power and prestige during 
the twenty year period, 1902-1922, have been briefly pre­
sented.
The years following the arrival of Ferry*s "black 
ships** demonstrated to Nippon that the West had a materialis­
tic superiority and technical knowledge which she too must
gaun In order to develop Into a modern nation. The treaties 
forced upon her by the American and European powers demon­
strated Nippon’s lack of governmental and legal knowledge of 
diplomatic methods. The restoration of the emperor would 
mark m period of national cohesion and which demonstrated 
the Japanese nation as perhaps the most thoroughly Integrated 
country in the world. The constitutions and governmental 
machinery, legal codes, armed forces and industrial techniques 
were studied in the leading capitals of the world In order to
bring famm to out of the feudal age.
The success of the modernisation period was demonstrated 
by the crushing defeat over China. Yet the Triple Inter­
vention served as a warning that Tokyo could not expect to
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stand alone again®t m combination of nations. Following her 
second major military victory in the Husso-Japanese war, 
the Tokyo Government undertook hy a series of treaties,
alliances and "notes* both open and secret, to define her 
status in China and Korea. She Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 
first signed in 1902, and renewed in 1905 and 1911, was 
Tokyo’s first defensive alliance with any foreign nation, and 
it cannot be denied that Japan lived up to the obligations 
towards her partner, Britain.
2be World War years brought Nippon both praise and 
universal condemnation. While aha participated in the war to 
a limited degree, her harsh treatment of China a® represented 
by the ”Twenty-One Demands" did much to away world opinion 
In favor of China. The Faking Government however, was not 
entirely without fault. Avarice for money, power struggles 
and national disunity contributed to China’s weakness. On 
one hand, China could deliberately negotiate heavy loans in­
volving millions of dollars; on the other, she could disown 
them on the grounds that they were not legal in form..
Prince Salonji led his delegation to Paris convinced 
that, with the exception of the racial equality issue, Japan 
could not possibly lose its case since she had already ob­
tained advance approval of two of her desiderata by secret
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treaties and agreements concerning the Shantung leasehold and 
the German colonies north of the equator. The achievement of 
these two goals gave her a temporary v 1 ctory i- ^hi c n was to be 
partially shattered at the Washington Conference.
Prince Tokugawa and his colleagues went to Washington 
in 1921 with a suspicion that Nippon was due to lose some of 
her wartime gains. The open and frank approach of Secretary 
Hughes, so contrary to the indirect and vague approach so 
peculiar to the oriental concept of "face,1 startled the Japan­
ese delegation. They wholeheartedly joined in the spirit of 
the negotiations and one cannot but admire their forthright 
manner in negotiating the Five Power Naval Treaty. By the 
terms of this Treaty, Nippon gained a reasonable assurance 
that it would not be attacked by either the United States or 
Great Britain. At the same time, Japan was allowed to retain 
a relative share of its naval tonnage.
The failure of London to renew the Anglo-Japanese Alli­
ance came as a blow to the delegation and indeed, to Japan.
The Four Power Pact, while acceptable in form, was not con­
sidered to be in the same light as their first defensive alli­
ance which endured the test of time.
The Nine Power Treaty, in turn, was a keen disappoint­
ment to China in that it did not go far enough in giving her
complete autonomy over her affairs* In face of world opin­
ion, Tokyo gave Peking some concessions which were at least 
equal to those of the Nest*
The matter of the fhantung settlement was hotly de­
bated and the mediation of Secretary Hughes and Hr# Balfour 
largely aided the two nations in reaching a satisfactory set­
tlement# Trie remaining issues of Tiber la and Tap were easily 
disposed of# In a fifteen minute speech, Baron fhidehara 
promised that Japanese troops would leave Liberia* The Tap 
mandate to Japan was confirmed by the American Government; 
Nippon, in turn, agreed to grant full us© of the cable sta­
tion to the United - States#
The reasons behind Japan’s actions are not treated In 
this study# However, during these twenty years, she was 
striving for status and power# The achievements of these 
objective© was readily gained and the events of later history 
serves to Illustrate that this is so*
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ABB ABA B:B.j'. :r: ,x;?a a:-:./ xoaaa, jaS'Jaht 30, 90
The 3 over rtraenta of Great Britain and Japan# actuated 
solely by a dec Ire to mairit&lu the statua quo and general 
peace in" the extrema Bast, bel n& moreover specially laterals ted 
In maintain the independence and territorial Integrity of 
Empire of lidpe of China and th© Aspire of Corea and in 
securing e<$u*~l opportunities in those eountrles for the com- 
merce and Industry of all nations, hereby agree as follow®j
Artla1# 1* The High Contrast!ng fartloa having 
mutually rooo, I eel tit* lnd@pen.de tic© of Chism and Corea de­
clare t-se usalv*, tot# entirely uninfluenced by any aggres­
sive tendencies In either country# Having in view however, 
theIf epee laX Internsfc®, of which those of Croat Britain re­
late principally to China# while Japan# in. addition to the 
.interest# which ah© possesses In China, Is Interested In a 
peculiar degree politically as well a© commercially and In­
dustrially In Corea# the High Contracting ;urtle$ recognise 
inti it will be admissible for ©it' ex* of'them to safeguard 
thcee Intereate If threatened either by the aggreasIve action 
of any other iorer, or by disturbances arising in China or 
Corea* and ne< * ~ Itabing the Intervention of either of the
’Ugh ContractI ’arfcles for the protection of the 11 vac and 
property of it ^lb jests-*
Article XX* If olti'jer Or#at Britain or Japan# In the 
defence of their respective Interests as above described# 
should become involved In war with another fawvr, the other 
high Contrasting Party will maintain a strict neutrality, 
and use Its efforts to prevent other bowera from joining In 
hostilities egainst Its ally#
Article III* If# In the above event, any other Iower 
or rowera should Join li h>stillties against that ally, the 
at hex* BIgn Contracting < arty will oooo to its a® slats no a 
and will conduct the war in common, and mate© peace in nutu&I 
agreement wlfcli it*
\*3riti&h X3ooument& on ti*© friglas of the war# II# 
pp# lip-XTvT* ~ ~
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Article IV* the Sigh. Contract trig Parties agree 
t'h&t neither of them will, without consulting tha other, 
enter Into separate arrangement* with another Power to 
t1h» pro jud la a of the 1 nteran ts ahove described#
Article V* whenever, in the opinion of either Great 
Britain or Japan, the above~3ient toned interests are In 
Jeopardy, the two Cover mien is will eomunleate with o m  
another fully and frankly*
Article VI# The present Agreenent shall ooue into of foot 
i m e d lately after the date of Its signature, and regain In
force for five ye&r^ froa that date*
In case neither of the High Contracting Parties shall 
have notified twelve months before the expiration of the 
said five years the intention of terminating it, It shall 
r©js«in hind lug until the expiration of one year fro&i the day 
on which either of trie hl;;h Contracting 2 art lea shall have 
denounced it* But if, wuen the date fixed for its expiration 
arrives, eIther ally ,1s actually engaged in war, the alliance 
shall, Ipso facto, continue until peace in concluded#
la faith whereof, ©te*
Done in duplicate at London, the 3'Cth day of January,
1902*
iJiHA^ i'rAUU
HAiASnX
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AVfmijix o
■? m x r - m r i m  THE IGThGurri ■ •'J CuIbA, TJU ••AhluU. 
PEACE OP KAIT£;3J A:tA AhD tMiJ TA APE E P  TABhifGhXAL HIOATS 
kUD special x x T ^ m y m  ow tap fahtx... ip tbgsu isegigus
A11 PIP' T 12, 1905
The Government of Great Britain and Japan, being 
desirous of roplaolag the Agreement concluded between them 
on tbe 30 th January 1902, by fresh stipulations, nave agreed 
upon the following Articles, which have for their object:
(a) The consolidation and aaaintenanc© of the general 
peaoo In the regions of lectern Asia arid India#
(b) Tiie 'preaervation of the ©o m o n  Interests of all 
powers In China, by injuring the independence and integrity
of the Chinese Hasp Ire and tlic principle of equal opportunities 
for the aonmeroe and industry of ©11 nations in China*
Co) The maintenance of the territorial rinuts of the 
High Contracting Parties in the regions of Baatern *>sia and 
of India , and the defence of t-hclr special interests In the 
said regions#
Article I# It in agreed that whenever, In the opinion 
of © ifcner Great Britain or Japan* any of the rights and Inter­
ests referred to in the preamble of this Agreement arc in 
jeopardy, tlm two (Governments will communicate with one another 
fully and frankly, and will consider In coramon the measures 
which should be taken, to -safeguard those menaced rights or 
Interests.
Article II# If by reason of unprovoked attach or 
agreeslv© action, wherever arista* , on the part of any other 
Power or Powers either GDetracting Party should ha Involved 
In war In defence of Its territorial rights or special inter­
ests sent I »nj- in the preamble of this Agreement, the other 
Contract' * arty will at one a com© to the assistance of its 
ally, any wilr conduct the wax* in oosaoii, and smke peace In 
mutual agreement with it.
pp. 16>-T
ritlsh Documents on the hr of the V/ar» IV,
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Article lit. Japan possessing paramount political,
military* and eoonomle Interests In Corea, Great Britain 
recognises the right of Japan to take aucn measures of 
guidance, control, and protection in Corea a* she nay do eta 
proper and necessary to safeguard and advance those interests, 
provided always that such treasures arc not contrary to too 
principle of equal opportunities} for the commerce and indus­
try of all nations#
Art to la XV* Ore at Britain having a open lal Intercut 
In all that concerns the security of the Indian frontier,
Japan recognises her* right to take such measures in ti*e proximity 
of that frontier as- nsm nay find necessary for safeguarding 
her Indian possess Ions#
Article 7* The 1 Contracting fartlas agree that 
neither o f t is j will, w*t out consulting the other, enter into 
separate arrange ;aotii wit another Power to th# prejudtoo of 
the objects described in i-e preamble of this Agreement#
Article 71* As regard-a the present war between Japan 
and hassla, Great Britain will continue to maintain strict 
neutrality unless some *t -j; rowor or Powers should join 
in hostilities against oapi'u, in which case Great Britain 
will eo:w to toe as a Is tanc# of Japan, and will conduct tue 
war in common, and ma&e peace in mutual agreement with 
Japan#
A r t i c l e  VtX# -The c o n d it io n s  under w hich ar-rf*^ a s s is ta n c e  
s h a l l  be afforded by cither Power to t  o other in  fc**j c ire urn- 
stances n»o.ifclrm &o in th e  pro& ent Agr^e * o t ,  n n d  t o  eano by  
w hich auc:i a s s is ta n c e  Is  to  be .mad© a v a i la b le ,  w i l j ,  oe a rra n g e d  
by the Bevel and Nilifcary a u t  *’ *Ie« of the C o n tra c t in g  Par­
ties who will fro-', tl oe to  t l i  w irn su it on# anot.her f u l l y  and 
freely upon all questions of mutual interests.
Article VIII# The pre jo r.t Agraenavit a ball, sub joe t to
the provisions of article VI, o into offset immediately 
after the date of its s Ignatov, and re min In force for tan 
year o f r  o i  t an t  B a t a •
In oaae neither of the High Jontr&cting Fart las should 
have notified twelve ninths before th© expiration of the said 
tan years the intention of terminating it* It anaII remain 
binding until tri# expiration of one year from the day on which 
either ’ of the High Contracting Parties shall have denounceci it*
Dut if, when the* date fixed for its expiration arrives, either 
ally is actually engaged In war, the alliance shall ipso facto, 
continue until peace is concluded*
In faith whereof etc*
Done in duplicate at London, the 12th day of August, 19Gj>*
[l * f *1 LA I'* t jj^j t v li L
Hi a Hrittanic Mmj- 
©sfcy1 a PrXno ip&l
Secretary of state 
for Foreign Affairs*
Jl .s .1 ?a o a£'* HttM&ni
- Envoy i3xtr a ordinary 
and Minister Pleni­
potentiary of lie 
Ma Je a ty t he tp or or 
of Japan at 
Court of St* James*
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JIILX 31, X9I11
e b a a a j b s
The Ooverrcaent of Groat Britain ana th© O o w m n e n t  of 
Japan, leaving in view trio important changes which have ban©a 
place in the-situation since the ocmelviaion of the Anglo- 
Japensa© Agreement of the 12th of August 190$, and believing 
that revision of that Agreement responding to such changes 
•would contribute to general stability an4 repose, have agreed 
upon the following stipulations to replace the Agreement 
above mentioned, such stipulations having the same object as 
the said Agrees!©r»t# namely;
(a) fli® consolidation ana \3&lr*fce nance of the general
peace In the regions of has tern Asia and of India#
(b) fhe preaervet <, of the c o w n  interacts of all
fowors In China by Irisurl the indopenaeaao and integrity 
of the Chinese hup ire ana fc.u. principle of equal opportunities 
for the ©amerce and industry of all nations in China*
{©) fh© mint© nance of the territorial rights of the 
High Contracting fartlee In the ro uons of haatcro Asia 
and of India, and the defence of t olr special Interacts* in 
t h a s aid re g 1 o rm t
Article I* It Is anxo^w that whenever, In, the opinion 
of either Great Britain or Ju >an, any of the rl fits and 
Inters© t© referred to In. the preamble of this ^grcsmoufc are 
in jeopardy, the two Gtatvernmente will communicate with one 
another fully and frankly, mad will consider In common the 
ma«ur©» which should b® taken to safeguard those menaced 
r i i\b® and 1 ntorecta*
Article II* If by reason of unprovoked attack or 
aggressive actio?;, wherever ©.rising, on the part of any bower
pp* S3
 ^^ British Doe, am© nts on the Or ini us of the, Bar, 71II.
or .Powers, either High Contracting Party should be involved 
in war in defence of Its territorial rlekts or special 
luteresto mentioned in the preamble of tala Byres~o ,t, the 
other high hontraoting party will at ones some to t *o assist­
ance of Its ally, and "will conduct the war in so? o  , and 
m k f  peace in mutual agreement with It*
Article III* The high Contracting Pmrilec agree that 
neither of them will, without eormultlng tha other, enter In­
to separate arrangeswnts with another rower to the prejudice of 
the obj^ats described in the preamble of this Agreement*
Article 17* should cither high Contracting Party con­
clude a treaty of general arbitration with a third Power, it 
is agreed that nothin' in this Agreement shall entail upon 
such Contracting Tarty an obligation to go to war with the 
Power with whom "such treaty of arbitration 1$ in force*
Article 7* The condition© under which m & m a  mseiat&ne# 
shall be afforded by either owe? to the other in the cire urn- 
stanceo mentioned In the ?ro .* .t Agreement, and the .moans by
which such assistance is t" °o urnd# available, will be arranged 
by the Bemh. and Billtary authortties of the High Contracting 
Partias, who will from tine to t" 03 consult 000 another fully 
and freely upon all questions’ o -Jttual Interest*
rtl^le 71* The pro coot Agreement shall oomo Into 
of foot * aw lately after too data of Its aigrmture, and remain 
iu force for tea yearn fro** tHat data* In oaso neither of the 
High Contracting Parties j *i have notified twelve m i  * 
before the expiration, of  ^v « eld ten year® the IntentI > of 
terminating it, it shall remain binding until the, expiration 
of cue year from the day on which either of the i.tg*. Contrac­
ting Parties? shall have denounced It* But If, when the da to 
fim d  for its expiration arrives, either ally Is actually en­
gaged In war, the alliance shall, Ipso facto# continue until 
p*aoo is concluded# * *” ' ’
In faith whereof, etc*
Bone In duplicate at London, on the 13th day of duly 1911
&• GBtiT
.Bis Hr11 ta 111 a v'"a jea ty * a 
Principal Pecrotary of Ht&to 
for Foreign Affairs#
BAhhiUiI iuiTO,
Ambassador Axtraordinary a no
Plenipotentiary of his Hmjes 
ty the Bmperor of Japan at 
the Court of p fc* Jamaa#
APPSKDXX 1
TUG T'UinTf Go AMhGIATXOG# SXG^IW AIJCHfST 2OT, 1910 B M t m m  
RJHX J&H 1VCIHNSEAL ?XSG0Ullf TSRAUCBI A HD MR# XX WAtf-XOHO* 
ntnx^vm imstDEiiT of o:? eosea*1
A-tlTXCLis.' X
The Emperor of Korea to smk© complete ana permanent 
evasion to tha Emperor of Japan of all eights and sovereignty 
over tha whole of Korea*
AiiTICLS XI
The Emperor of Japan, to accept tha above-mentioned 
©©©©ton# and to oonaent to tha complete mmwxutton of Korea
to the Empire of Japan*
ARTICLE III
Ttm j£mp® vox* of Japan to accord to the Emperor of A or© a* 
ex>I&3?erar ana Oronn Frina© of Korea end their Consorts ©ueh 
feitlea* dignities* ftod honors &s are appropriate to their 
respective Vonks# and sufficient annual grant© to be mad© 
for'th© maintenance of ©uoh titles* dignities and honours#
AimCLS 19
ft*© relative© of the Emperor of Korea also to receive
slue dignities# titles * honours and solatia#
AHXICXjS f
The Emperor of Japan to confer peerage© and monetary 
grant© upon 'Koreans Mho, on account of meritorious services 
are regarded a® deserving, epeeial recognition#
AimCLE VX
In consequence of the? afores&la Annexation# tha Govern- 
meat of Japan will aiauna tn© out Ire goverwaen t and administra­
tion of Chosen and undertafc* to afford full protection for ta© 
life and properfcy of Koreans obeying the law© In force# and to 
promote tho welfare of all ouch*
jumcLG m i l
The Government of Japan# so far as ciroumaianoes 
permit will employ ira the public aervIce of Japan# Koreans 
who accept the new re&isa© loyally and in good faith and who 
are duly qualified For'subh aarvlce*
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apfssdix p
TEXT OF TEE JAPAIJEOE Bfc&LA.UTICtf OF Ehi AGa IFF T OiwiFAKr"
We hereby declare war against Germany find we oom&and 
our A ray and F&vy to carry 03 hostilltlea against that em­
pire with all toeir strength, and we also command all our 
competent authorities to o&lco every effort in pursuance of 
their respective duties to attain the national a If within 
the Unit of the law of nations*
Since the outbreak of the yreaont war in Europe# 
the calamitous effort of which wo vict? with grave concern, 
vc, on our part* ham entertained ines of preserving the 
peace of tm Far Fast by the mint * * *co of strict neutrali­
ty, but the action of 0©r--mny has at Xe tn compelled Treat 
■Or i tain, our ally* to open hostilities v cinst that country, 
and Ccrmny Ic ci Klao~uh.au, its leaser territory in China, 
busy with war 1, prepara!'ions, while her ©med veroala, 
cruising the n . " of western As la, are threaten In - our 
eon cure a and a -** of our slip. The peace of the "ar fast la 
thur In jeopardy#
Accordingly, our Government and that of hia Eritannic 
Fsjacty, after a full and frank 0ommuulcation with each other, 
agreed to take such measures as nay b© neeessary for the 
protection of t m  general inter©' t conte plated la the agree­
ment of alliance, and we 00 our part, boing desirous to 
attain that object by peaceful nasm * ©o?‘W<nbed our fo^orn^at 
to offer* with sincerity, an advlo© to the hornan Cover incut# 
Fy tiuj lani Fay appointee for the purpose, however, our hov­
er ih?w*r«t failed to receive an answer accept 1 >nr advice*
It is wit.n profound xugrct that v«, - ^plte of our
arwew.t devotion to i.a© cavu© of peace, arc t compelled 
to declare war* ea-peolalX/ fox* our mtaer.
It is our or met wish that, by the loyal by and valor 
of our faithful subject*, pnuco m y  coon be restored and fch® 
glory of the empire ^nhEfiSfc*
'4ir,lpt:orf; of t lit* Ffcpa;.oLo-fer • igi gas* of 1 Oil* 9 (trans­
lation fF5*-F tHe ^bin©s<r^Trprl;.5r*r i™co a.nc ’olf .fix© at 
Fdu11!!r*a r v>t General Ftaf.f loll©go, 'rort beav,;twort-U, Fanses), 
T, op, 10-.11.
A.PPSS0IX a
m s  Exc:uvr«a r>? kot^s, 19171
Bote from, the.. yecrefc&ry of rute tp the Japanese Ambassador
DhmhThhh? w  ufATh
Vlas hi net on* Koros&er Z $ 1911
£&q olio 007:
I have the honor to eorriunlo&te therein ny unde ret arid tng 
of the agreement r e M h e d  by us In our recant conversations 
touching the questions of mutual Intercut to our governmeate 
relating to the Hepublie of China*
In order to silence mischievous xv, 5jr*t that have from 
time to time been circulated it is believe** by us that m public 
announcement once more of t he dec irea and latentions shared by 
our two govern; meats with regard to China In advisable*
The governments of the United utatcs and Japan recognise 
that -territorial propinquity creates special relations between 
countries* and consequently, the government of the halted 
its tee recognised that Jape? iur? special interests la China, 
particularly In the part to *• itch her possess lone arc contiguous* 
The Territorial a o vere i^nty of China, never the la sirs, 
re-roe ins unlm aired and the government of the United . tafces has 
every cotif ideurj in the repeated assurances cf the Tu.serial 
Jopaneao government that while geographical position -luce 
Japan such special interests they -have no deaira to ulscrlru- 
loate against fcne trade of other nations or to disregard the 
ooswiero1©1 rights heretofore grantee by Jhhm in treaties with 
other powers*
The governments of tne United ifcstos and Japan deny that 
they have any purpose to Infringe In any wag the Independence 
or territorial Integrity of China, ana they declare, further** 
more, that they always adhere to the principle of the sa-o&Xied 
rfop€ii door” or equal opportunity for commerce and Indies try in
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Moreover* they mutually declare that they sr« opposed 
to the acquisition by any government of any special rights 
or privileges that would affect the independence or territorial 
integrity of China or that would deny to the subjects or 
citizens of any country the full enjoyment of equal opportunity 
in the commerce and industry of Chin®#
1 shall be glad to have four Excellency confirm this 
understending of the agreement reached by us.
Accept, Excellency, the renewed assurance of my highest 
cons i dmrmtion.
(Signed) Robert Lansing
Mots .from the Japanese Ambassador to the Secretary of State
m s  Si'BCML KiSSiOK OF JAFAtf 
Washington, Hovernier 2 a 1917
Sirs
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note 
of today, eoxmmmica ting to mm your under standing of the 
agreement reached by us in our recent conversation touching 
the questions of mutual interests; to our governments relating 
to the republic of China.
1 am happy to be able to confirm to you, under authorisa­
tion of my government, the undera tending in question set 
forth in the following termss
Her© the special Ambassador repeats the language of the 
agreement as given in Secretary Lansing’s note.
(Sign©d) E. Xshii 
Ambassador Extraordinary and 
Plenipotentiary of Japan 
on Special Flags Ion
Honorable Robert Lansing 
Secretary of’ State
